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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court permits states to mandate pa-
rental consent for the abortion decisions of pregnant minors.' How-
ever, acknowledging that the constitutional right to abortion estab-
lished in Roe v. Wade extends to minors, the Court has delineated
the criteria that a parental consent statute must meet in order to steer
clear of a transgression of that right.4 Importantly, when requiring
parental consent, states must give minors the opportunity to petition
for a waiver of that consent.5 Additionally, a minor who petitions for
such a waiver must be granted her request if she demonstrates that
(i) she is mature and sufficiently informed to make a decision about
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See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding a Pennsylvania
parental consent provision).
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (overturning a Missouri
parental consent regulation and holding that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come
into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."). The Court has,
however, allowed states to treat pregnant teens differently from adult women given their age
and potential immaturity. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 427-
28 n.10 (1983) (overturning an Ohio parental consent statute and stating that "in view of the
unique status of children under the law, the States have a 'significant' interest in certain abor-
tion regulations aimed at protecting children 'that is not present in the case of an adult.'").
4 See Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I1), 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (holding that states must provide a
statutory alternative to parental consent).
5 Id. at 643 ("[I]f the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both par-
ents' consent to an abortion, it also must provide an alternative procedure whereby authoriza-
tion for the abortion can be obtained." (footnote omitted)).
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abortion, or (ii) even if not mature and informed, the abortion is in
her best interest.6 The eighteen states that presently require parental
consent when minors seek abortions designate judges as the arbiters
of the waiver process.
While the Supreme Court has outlined the parameters for crafting
a constitutionally sound consent statute,8 and while states have par-
roted the language of Court opinions in order to satisfy these pa-
rameters, 9 in practice, the application of the judicial waiver process
varies considerably, not only from state to state, but also from court to
court and judge tojudge. For example, for some judges the grant of
a waiver petition turns on whether the minor has received counseling
from the physician who will perform the abortion.' ° Other judges
appoint a guardian to represent the fetus in waiver hearings.1 Be-
cause waiver hearings are closed and records of those hearings are
6 Id. at 643-44.
These states include Alabama, Arizona, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See ALAN GUTrMACHER INST.,
STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN MINORS' ABORTIONS 1, 2 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT] (displaying a chart of states which require parental consent for
minors' abortions), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib-PIMA.pdf
(last updated Oct. 1, 2004). In addition, Maine encourages parental consent, but allows minors
to easily bypass that consent by receiving counseling. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597-A
(West 2000) (providing that a pregnant minor may obtain an abortion after obtaining counsel-
ing notwithstanding a lack of parental consent).
s The Court has yet to do the same for laws that require parental notification before a phy-
sician may perform an abortion on a pregnant minor. In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, the Court upheld a parental notification requirement that included a judicial waiver
option, holding that "it is a corollary to the greater intrusiveness of consent statutes that a by-
pass procedure that will suffice for a consent statute will suffice also for a notice statute." 497
U.S. 502, 511 (1990). However, the Court left unresolved whether mandated parental notice
laws must incorporate a waiver option, explaining that "notice statutes are not equivalent to
consent statutes because they do not give anyone a veto power over a minor's abortion deci-
sion." Id. (citation omitted). Despite this ambiguity, thirteen of the fourteen states that man-
date parental notice of abortion include a judicial waiver option. See PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT,
supra note 7, at 2.
9 For example, under Tennessee's Parental Consent for Abortion by Minors Act, a minor
may petition a juvenile court judge for an order waiving mandated consent and the "consent
requirement shall be waived if the court finds either that: (1) The minor is mature and well-
informed enough to make the abortion decision on the minor's own; or (2) The performance
of the abortion would be in the minor's best interests." TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-304(e)
(2001).
10 See Ex parte Anonymous, 808 So. 2d 1030, 1033-34 (Ala. 2001) (upholding denial of peti-
tion to waive parental consent for minor's failure to consult with physician who would have per-
formed her abortion).
11 See In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d 497 (Ala. 1998) (denying right of fetus through its guard-
ian to appeal order granting minor's petition for waiver of parental consent), aff'g 720 So. 2d
497 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (dismissing the appeal of a fetus by its guardian).
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sealed, 2 such practical variations are often obscured. Owing both to
confidentiality requirements and the generality of the guidelines
governing waiver proceedings, judges authorized to preside over the
process enjoy substantial discretion.'3
This Article exposes for examination judicial discretion in waiver
proceedings that raises First Amendment Establishment Clause issues.
Several juvenile court judges in Alabama condition waiver grants on
the requirement that pregnant minors receive counseling from a pro-
life organization. 4  These judges and other court personnel direct
minors to obtain pregnancy counseling from a non-profit crisis preg-
nancy center called Sav-A-Life.' 5 In the absence of counseling from
Sav-A-Life, these judges will deny waiver petitions, justifying their de-
nial on the ground that the minor has not received sufficient infor-
mation about abortion, its consequences, and its alternatives.1
6
Judges undoubtedly have substantial leeway in determining what it
means for a minor to be mature and informed, and what serves a
young woman's best interest. Indeed, Supreme Court rulings are vir-
tually silent as to the process by which arbiters of waiver hearings
should arrive at these determinations." But Court precedent is any-
12 Parental involvement statutes usually specify the means for protecting the identity of mi-
nors. For instance, the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act provides that court proceedings pur-
suant to ajudicial waiver request shall be kept confidential and that a
court of common pleas which conducts proceedings.., shall make in writing specific
factual findings and legal conclusions supporting its decision and shall, upon the initial
filing of the minor's petition for judicial authorization of an abortion, order a sealed re-
cord of the petition, pleadings, submissions, transcripts, exhibits, orders, evidence and
any other written material to be maintained which shall include its own findings and
conclusions.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206(f) (1) (2002).
13 For a discussion of discretion in waiver hearings, see Suellyn Scarnecchia & Julie Kunce
Field, Judging Girls: Decision Making in Parental Consent to Abortion Cases, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
75 (1995) (examining the conduct of waiver hearings in Michigan and arguing thatjudicial dis-
cretion results from lack of guidance on how hearings should be conducted).
14 We have heard a few anecdotal reports ofjudges in other states requiring Christian-based
counseling. But we have no evidence that the practice of mandating pro-life counseling is wide-
spread either in Alabama or elsewhere. While not yet a widespread practice, in Alabama's
fourth largest county, two of the three juvenile court judges routinely mandate such counseling.
Hence, the counseling mandate must now be considered a feature of Alabama's parental con-
sent law. In addition, as we argue below, the constitutional injury generated by this mandate is
significant and ongoing. For these reasons it is worth considering whether this counseling
mandate would withstand an Establishment Clause challenge.
15 See infra Part II.B.
16 See infra Part II.B.
17 The Court has offered passing comments concerning the criteria for judging whether a
minor meets the standards for waiving parental consent. According to the Court, "the peculiar
nature of the abortion decision requires the opportunity for case-by-case evaluations of the ma-
turity of pregnant minors." Bellotti II, 443 U.S. 622, 643 n.23 (1979). In addition, the Court has
said, "[i]n a given case, alternatives to abortion, such as marriage to the father of the child, ar-
ranging for its adoption, or assuming the responsibilities of motherhood with the assured sup-
port of family, may be feasible and relevant to the minor's best interests." Id. at 642-43. De-
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thing but silent with respect to those instances when religion and
government action intersect.18 At first glance, this pro-life counseling
requirement may appear to have little to do with the First Amend-
ment and more to do with the Fourteenth Amendment.' 9 Establish-
ment Clause questions surface, however, when we consider that Sav-A-
Life is a Christian ministry "under-girded by a commitment to evan-
gelism and Biblical truth,20 which, having "accepted the challenge of
sharing God's love and truth with a society that is increasingly hostile
to the sanctity of human life,",2 ' aims "to see the truth of God's Word
birthed in the hearts of men and women and to make abortion un-
necessary and undesirable in our region.,
2
This Article argues that conditioning the waiver process on a mi-
nor's receipt of pro-life counseling from Say-A-Life violates the Estab-
lishment Clause. We argue that the Sav-A-Life counseling require-
ment fails each of the current legal tests used to assess alleged
Establishment Clause violations. And while one might think the fact
that Sav-A-Life is a religiously-based ministry should itself be enough
to prove an Establishment Clause violation, because Court precedent
tolerates considerable association between government and religious
23institutions, it simply is not. Indeed, in 1988 the Court upheld
against a facial challenge a federal grant program that dispersed
funds to religiously affiliated institutions to be used for the education
and counseling of adolescents on subjects pertaining to sexual rela-
tions and pregnancy. In light of this and other accommodationist
decisions, the judicial mandate at issue here needs to be differenti-
ated from those accommodations to reveal what conduct, in the end,
constitutes a breach of the First Amendment.
spite these remarks, commentators note the dearth of guidelines for judging maturity and best
interests. See, e.g., Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's Capacity to
Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1873 (noting that the Court has given no direction as to how a
child's maturity is to be ascertained); Anita J. Pliner & Suzanne Yates, Psychological and Legal Is-
sues in Minors' Rights to Abortion, J. Soc. ISSUES, Fall 1992, at 203 (stating that the Supreme Court
and state legislatures have given judges limited direction for determining when a waiver should
be granted); Scarnecchia & Field, supra note 13, at 77-80 (commenting that "the Supreme
Court has left trial courts to define 'maturity' and 'best interests'").
IS See infra Part I.
19 Independent of Establishment Clause considerations, one might well question on Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process grounds whether the Constitution permits judges to make pro-
life counseling a necessary condition for a minor's demonstration that she is sufficiently in-
formed to proceed with an abortion absent parental consultation. But that inquiry is separate
from the question that occupies us here.
20 See Say-A-Life, Inc., Home Page [hereinafter Sav-A-Life, Home Page] (on file with author)
(stating Say-A-Life's mission, which includes devotion to the absolute truth of the Creator's
word).
21 Id.
2 Id.
23 See infra Part I.E.
24 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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Part I of this Article reviews Establishment Clause precedent and
the various tests used to discern when government action amounts to
a prohibited religious establishment. Part II describes the judicial
practice of mandating pro-life counseling and presents evidence ob-
tained in interviews with directors of Sav-A-Life affiliates that illumi-
nates the religious character of their counseling. Part III shows how,
despite the prevailing accommodative approach to religion found in
Establishment Clause precedent, Alabama judges violate the First
Amendment when they require minors to receive counseling from
Sav-A-Life. Part IV considers parallel case law in the context of man-
dated Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous substance
abuse treatment programs for prisoners and parolees, showing how
these rulings do not sustain a counterargument to our analysis. The
Conclusion considers the magnitude of this constitutional violation
and explains how an unmistakable encroachment on the Establish-
ment Clause, one committed by judges, is allowed to persist.
I. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PRECEDENT
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion."' 5
In an early statement construing the Establishment Clause expan-
sively, the Court in Everson v. Board of Education declared that the
clause must mean at least
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Nei-
ther can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to
or remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a be-
lief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertain-
ing or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, par-
ticipate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words ofJefferson, the clause against establishment of relig-
ion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between Church
and State."
2 6
25 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). The Court made this oft-quoted decla-
ration in the context of a challenge to a school district plan that reimbursed parents for the
costs of busing children to private schools. While this statement appears to give the Establish-
ment Clause an interpretation that sets a high wall between church and state, in fact the Everson
Nov. 20041
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The Court has since backed away from the absolutist language of
Everson and now relies on a trilogy of tests for judging whether a chal-
lenged activity violates the Establishment Clause. The tests, described
below, are known as the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the
coercion test.
A. The Lemon Test
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,27 the Court considered the constitutionality
of two school funding provisions-a Rhode Island statute that pro-
vided for payment of salary supplements of up to fifteen percent to
teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools 28 and a
Pennsylvania statute that provided for state reimbursement to non-
public elementary and secondary schools for costs of teachers' sala-
ries, textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular sub-
jects. 29 Recognizing that the "language of the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment is at best opaque"3 0 and, implicitly, that the lan-
guage would not, on its own, direct the proper result in the case, the
Court stated that "[i] n the absence of precisely stated constitutional
prohibitions, we must draw lines with reference to the three main
evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford
protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement
of the sovereign in religious activity.'31 Collapsing into a three-prong
inquiry factors that the Court had, over the years, considered in de-
ciding Establishment Clause cases, the Court advanced what is com-
monly known as the Lemon test: "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with relig-
ion.', 3' The Court invalidated both the Rhode Island and the Penn-
sylvania statutes under the third prong, concluding that "the cumula-
tive impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in
each State involves excessive entanglement between government and
religion."
3
Court upheld the challenged funding. See infta Part I.E (arguing, inter alia, that the metaphori-
cal wall between church and state has been eroded by the policy of religious accommodation).
27 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
28 Id. at 607. Only teachers in Roman Catholic schools had applied for benefits under the
Rhode Island statute. Id. at 608.
29 Id. at 609-10.
30 Id. at 612.
31 Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
32 Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
3 Id. at 613-14. With respect to the Rhode Island program, the Court reasoned that the
substantial religious character of the church-related schools that received the statute's benefits
gave rise to entangling church-state relationships. Id. at 615-17. According to the Court,
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The Court has given the term "secular" in the first prong a broad
interpretation. In general, if the government can point to a secular
purpose, the action is not invalidated simply because it coincides with
religious beliefs. 4 The Court has said that "[w]hen a governmental
entity professes a secular purpose for an arguably religious policy, the
government's characterization is, of course, entitled to some defer-
ence."35 However, the Court has also cautioned that it is "the duty of
the courts to 'distinguis[h] a sham secular purpose from a sincere
one.' 36 Still, in its analyses the Court typically finds a sufficient secu-
37lar purpose and goes on to consider the other two Lemon prongs.
Under the second prong, the Court questions whether the gov-
ernmental action has the "'effect' of advancing or inhibiting relig-
ion. 38 Establishment Clause precedent strictly prohibits certain types
of effects. For example, the Court forbids government policies that
discriminate between religious denominations.39 Precedent also for-
teachers dedicated to their religion and working in a school designed to inculcate the tenets of
that religion, would invariably have difficulty segregating religious beliefs from secular educa-
tional responsibilities. Id. at 618-19. Moreover, the intensive monitoring required by the state
to implement the program's mandates itself was "fraught with the sort of entanglement that the
Constitution forbids." Id. at 620. Similarly, with respect to the Pennsylvania program, "the very
restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly non-ideological role
give rise to entanglements between church and state." Id. at 620-21. In addition, where the
Pennsylvania statute provided state financial aid directly to the church-related school, close con-
trol and surveillance, which would create the violative entanglement, were virtually guaranteed.
Id. at 621-22.
34 See Rachel F. Calabro, Comment, Correction Through Coercion: Do State Mandated Alcohol and
Drug Treatment Programs in Prisons Violate the Establishment Clause?, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 565, 575
(1998) (discussing the breadth of interpretations of "secular").
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (overturning a school district
policy that permitted, but did not require, a student-initiated nonsectarian prayer at all home
football games).
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., concurring)). Declining deference in this case and rejecting the purported secular purposes
put forward by the school district-to "foste[r] free expression of private persons... as well [as
to] solemniz[e] sporting events, promot[e] good sportsmanship and student safety, and estab-
lis[h] an appropriate environment for competition," id. at 309 (alteration in original)-the
Court found it "reasonable to infer that the specific purpose of the policy was to preserve a
popular 'state-sponsored religious practice,'" id. (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596
(1992)).
37 See Calabro, supra note 34, at 575-76 (using the example of Sunday closing laws to illus-
trate how the Court finds sufficient secular purposes in practices that developed out of religious
beliefs).
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997).
39 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) (concluding that the principle
"that government should not prefer one religion to another" is "at the heart of the Establish-
ment Clause"); see also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 52-54 (noting that the First Amendment proscribes
not only the preference of one Christian sect over another, but also the preference of any relig-
ion over another and even over no religion at all); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216-17
(1963) (citing Court precedent supporting the finding that the proscriptions of the Establish-
ment Clause are not limited to government preference of one religion over another).
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bids government indoctrination into the beliefs of a religion. ° Other
effects are not as easily defined or identifiable, and courts have strug-
gled to unpack the meaning of this second prong.4 1
The third Lemon prong often proves to be the deciding factor in
Establishment Clause cases. 2  In assessing Establishment Clause
claims under the excessive entanglement prong, the Court has exam-
ined "the character and purposes of the institutions that are bene-
fited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting
relationship between the government and religious authority., 43 But
the formation of tangible connections between government and re-
ligion-even where those connections include financial support or
administrative oversight--does not necessarily breach Lemon's third
prong.4 The Court, especially in recent years, has not rejected as ex-
cessively entangling relationships generated when government seeks
to accommodate religion. 5 The Court has said, "Interaction between
church and state is inevitable, and we have always tolerated some
level of involvement between the two. Entanglement must be 'exces-
sive' before it runs afoul of the Establishment Clause."46 Entangle-
ment becomes excessive, the Court has found, when governmental
aid or action necessitates pervasive monitoring of a religious organi-
zation by public authorities. 4' However, entanglement is not neces-
sarily excessive when aid flows to a religious organization as part of a
general welfare program, even when that aid produces the need for
government oversight; whether the resulting entanglement rises to
40 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) ("Although Establishment Clause juris-
prudence is characterized by few absolutes, the Clause does absolutely prohibit government-
financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular religious
faith."); see also infra Part III.A.2 (assessing the jurisprudence under the effects prong of the
Lemon test and discussing the contours of what constitutes impermissible indoctrination of relig-
ion).
41 See Calabro, supra note 34, at 576 (discussing the challenges posed by Lemon's second
prong).
42 See id. at 577 (concerning judicial struggles in applying the third prong).
43 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971)).
44 Id.; see also Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 764-65 (1976) (rejecting an exces-
sive entanglement claim where state grants to religious colleges are audited annually by the
state).
45 See, e.g., Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209 (upholding a New York City program that permitted pub-
lic school teachers to provide remedial education to students in private schools); Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 14 (1993) (finding that the use of a state-employed
sign-language interpreter in a Roman Catholic high school does not amount to excessive en-
tanglement); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 (1988) (holding that governmental grant
monitoring of religious organizations that receive funding for adolescent education does not
create excessive entanglement, at least where the grant recipients are not "pervasively sectar-
ian").
46 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233 (citation omitted).
47 Id.
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the level of excessive often depends on whether the religious institu-
tion is deemed pervasively sectarian.
The Lemon test has been derided since its inception. It has been
criticized for, among other things, its vagueness and lack of analytical
precision by both legal commentators49 and the Justices themselves.'
Thus, efforts to revise, clarify, and even discard the test have been a
feature of Establishment Clause rulings. Among the more notable
efforts to revise Lemon has been an attempt to collapse the second
and third prongs. The Court has, in recent cases applying Lemon,
treated the excessive entanglement prong as "an aspect of the inquiry
into a statute's [or another governmental action's] effect., 51 Indeed,
the Court has recognized that the factors used "to assess whether an
entanglement is 'excessive' are similar to the factors ... use[d] to ex-
amine 'effect.' 52 Despite this recognition, the Court has not defini-
tively reduced Lemon to a two-pronged test.
B. The Endorsement Test
Lemon remained the sole standard against which the Court meas-
ured alleged Establishment Clause violations s until, after growing
criticism of Lemon, a majority of the Court in 1989 adopted an alter-
nate test thatJustice O'Connor had previously formulated and urged:
the endorsement test. Suggesting an alternate endorsement-based
formulation as a "clarification" of Establishment Clause doctrine, Jus-
tice O'Connor, concurring in Lynch v. Donnelly, wrote:
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adher-
ence to religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political
community. Government can run afoul of that prohibition in two prin-
48 Id. at 234-35. Generally speaking, a pervasively sectarian institution is one in which, inter
alia, "religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the reli-
gious mission." Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973); see infra Part III.A.2.
49 See, e.g., Calabro, supra note 34, at 577 ("At best, its use is 'unclear and unpredictable' and
application of the Lemon test has often resulted in contradictory decisions.") (footnote omit-
ted); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 795, 801 (1993) ("[Tlhe
ambiguity of the test left the Court leeway to interpret each prong in varying ways, producing a
bewildering patchwork of decisions.... .").
50 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (comment-
ing that the application of the Lemon test has made a "maze of the Establishment Clause"); Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the "Lemon test
has caused this Court to fracture into unworkable plurality opinions"); see also Calabro, supra
note 34, at 577-78 nn.89 & 97 (cataloguing Lemon criticism in Supreme Court opinions).
51 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233.
52 Id. at 232-33.
53 Despite expressing "unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion" in Estab-
lishment Clause cases, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984), the Supreme Court applied
the Lemon test to every Establishment case it decided between 1971 and 1984, with the excep-
tion of Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). See
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679 (discussing history of Lemon test use).
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cipal ways. One is excessive entanglement with religious institutions ....
The second and more direct infringement is government endorsement
or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a message to nonadher-
ents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, fa-
vored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the oppo-
54
site message.
As articulated by Justice O'Connor, the endorsement test effectively
collapses the first two prongs of the Lemon test"5 and recasts them in
terms of perception:
5 6
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's ac-
tual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong
asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice
under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.
An affirmative answer to either question should render the challenged• . 57
practice invalid.5
Thus recast, the endorsement test considers whether a "'reasonable
observer' would view the challenged practice as conveying a message
of religious endorsement."
58
In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 9 the Court
formally adopted this test in its assessment of two separate religious
holiday displays in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.6 0 A majority in Allegheny
54 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
55 See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the phrase
"Under God" in the pledge of allegiance violates the Establishment Clause in part because it
conveys a message of state endorsement of religious beliefs), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). One commentator observes that
although the endorsement test can be viewed as being similar to the second Lemon prong, the
endorsement test prohibits a broader range of conduct. See Byron K. Henry, Comment, In "A
Higher Power" We Trust: Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition of Probation and Establishment of Relig-
ion, 3 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 443, 451 (1997) (noting that while the Lemon test, in requiring
that the "primary or principal effect" of the state action be one that neither advances nor inhib-
its religion, upheld state action with incidental or secondary effects that happened to advance
or inhibit religion, Lynch and Allegheny, applying the endorsement test, were more willing to
find such state actions unconstitutional).
56 See Derek P. Apanovitch, Note, Religion and Rehabilitation: The Requisition of God by the State,
47 DuKE L.J. 785, 799 (1998) (noting Justice O'Connor's persistent criticism of Lemon and de-
scribing her alternative approach).
57 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690.
58 Apanovitch, supra note 56, at 799-800 (relying on Capitol Square Review & Advisoy Board v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 778-79 (1995)). For further analysis of the Court's view of the role of the
reasonable observer, see James E. McBride, Note, Alcoholics Anonymous: Anonymous Theists? Grif-
fin v. Coughlin and the "Wall of Separation Between Church and State" in the New York State Prison
System, 19 CARDoZo L. REV. 1455, 1478 (1998).
59 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
60 At issue in Allegheny was whether a Christian nativity scene placed on the Allegheny
County Courthouse staircase and a Chanukah menorah placed outside of an office building
jointly owned by the city of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County violated the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 578. The crhche, which stood alone on the staircase, displayed a banner proclaiming
"Gloria in Excelsis Deo!" ("Glory to God in the Highest!") and a sign indicating that it was dedi-
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agreed that the endorsement test helps to clarify the Lemon test by fo-
cusing Establishment Clause consideration on "whether the chal-
lenged governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of 'en-
dorsing' religion. '1 Quoting O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch, the
Court declared,
Whether the key word is "endorsement," "favoritism," or "promo-
tion," the essential principle remains the same. The Establishment
Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a
position on questions of religious belief or from "making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political com-
munity.
62
The Court further explained, in applying the endorsement test to the
challenged holiday displays, that the constitutionality of such gov-
ernmental conduct6 turns on whether "the challenged governmental
action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the con-
trolling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents
as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices."'
Since Allegheny, courts have applied the endorsement test primar-
ily to cases involving the constitutionality of public religious displays.5
cated by a Roman Catholic group. Id. at 580. The menorah stood next to the city's forty-five-
foot decorated Christmas tree, at the base of which was a sign bearing the mayor's name and
declaring the city's "salute to liberty" during the holiday season. Id. at 582. A Jewish group
owned the menorah, but each year the city stored, erected, and removed the display. Id. at
579-82.
61 Id. at 592.
6I d. at 593-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687).
The Court explained that the fact that the crhche bore a sign disclosing its ownership by a
Roman Catholic organization did not alter the constitutional analysis: "[T]he Establishment
Clause does not limit only the religious content of the government's own communications. It
also prohibits the government's support and promotion of religious communications by reli-
gious organizations." Id. at 600.
Id. at 597 (quoting Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985)). Applying
this analysis, the Court ruled the cr&he display unconstitutional but upheld the constitutional-
ity of the menorah display. The court framed the issue as "whether the display of the creche
and the menorah, in their respective 'particular physical settings,' has the effect of endorsing or
disapproving religious beliefs." Id. Reasoning that "nothing in the context of the [cr~che] dis-
play detracts from the creche's religious message," the Court found that Allegheny had chosen,
by placing the creche on its own in the "'main' and 'most beautiful part' of the building that is
the seat of county government.., to celebrate Christmas in a way that ha[d] the [prohibited]
effect of endorsing a patently Christian message." Id. at 598-99, 601. By contrast, the context
of the menorah display communicated a secular message:
[T]he relevant question for Establishment Clause purposes is whether the combined
display of the tree, the sign, and the menorah has the effect of endorsing both Christian
and Jewish faiths, or rather simply recognizes that both Christmas and Chanukah are
part of the same winter-holiday season, which has attained a secular status in our society.
Of the two interpretations of this particular display, the latter seems far more plausible
and is also in line with Lynch.
Id. at 616.
See, e.g., Joki v. Bd. of Educ., 745 F. Supp. 823 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that a student
painting of a man nailed to a wooden cross displayed in a public high school auditorium vio-
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However, the test turns up as well in some reviews of cases involving
prayer or religious education in public schools and state religious
holidays.66
C. The Coercion Test
S 67
In Lee v. Weisman, the Court adopted the coercion test as an in-
dependent means for assessing Establishment Clause challenges. In
holding that an invocation and benediction by a clergy member at a
public secondary school graduation ceremony violated the Estab-
lishment Clause, the Court relied on the principle that "government
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its ex-
ercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or
religious faith, or tends to do so."' That the Constitution "at a mini-
mum" prohibits such coercion is, Justice Kennedy explained in his
ruling, beyond dispute.69
The context of the religious expression proved important to the
Court's analysis in Lee. Distinguishing the case from an earlier deci-
sion upholding the practice of opening a state legislative session with
70
a prayer, Justice Kennedy noted that "there are heightened con-
cerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive
pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools. 7 ' The
lated the Establishment Clause by conveying a message of government endorsement of Christi-
anity).
See Apanovitch, supra note 56, at 800 n.80 (listing various other contexts in which the en-
dorsement test was applied). In Allegheny, Justice Blackmun cites instances beyond religious
displays in which the Court used the concept of endorsement, noting, for example, that in Wal-
lace, "the Court held unconstitutional Alabama's moment-of-silence statute because it was 'en-
acted. .. for the sole purpose of expressing the State's endorsement of prayer activities.'" 492
U.S. at 592 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985)).
67 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
Id. at 587 (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
Under this principle, coercion is sufficient but not necessary to show a breach of the Establish-
ment Clause. Id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d
597, 607 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002) (cataloguing cases indicating that coercion is not a necessary ele-
ment in finding an Establishment Clause violation).
Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. Commentators dispute, however, "the terms and type of coercion
sufficient to constitute an Establishment Clause violation." Calabro, supra note 34, at 580. As
one commentator explains, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion focused on the psychological
coercion resulting from the peer or social pressure to participate in the exercise. Id. By con-
trast,Justice Scalia's dissent criticized the psychological coercion test and instead applied a legal
coercion test, defining prohibited conduct as "coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial
support by force of law and threat of penalty." Id. (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting)). Justice Blackmun's concurrence advanced another formulation of the coercion test,
suggesting that if government pressures someone to participate in a religious activity, that activ-
ity is "an obvious indication that the government is endorsing or promoting religion." Id. at 581
(quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun,J., concurring)).
70 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 596-97 (distinguishing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
7' Id. at 592.
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Court reasoned that the school district's supervision and control of
the graduation ceremony placed public and peer pressure on attend-
ing students to participate in, or at least show respect by maintaining
silence during, the invocation and benediction. In the Court's view,
"In this atmosphere the state-imposed character of an invocation and
benediction by clergy selected by the school combine to make the
prayer a state-sanctioned religious exercise in which the student was
left with no alternative but to submit."73 According to the Court,
"This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt
compulsion. The Court concluded that the state could not, consis-
tent with Establishment Clause principles, uphold the invocation and
benediction practice; doing so would place primary and secondary
school children-objectors in the impermissible position of choosing
between participating in such a religious exercise or protesting.7
D. Interaction of the Three Establishment Clause Tests
Despite its adoption of the endorsement and coercion tests, the
Court has not overruled or entirely abandoned the Lemon test. In-
stead, the Court maintains three alternative tests and, as recent case
law instructs, a failure to meet any one of the tests is sufficient to
show an Establishment Clause violation. However, the Court has
not provided clear guidance about the conditions under which each
of these tests ought to apply and itself chooses, often based on no
stated or obvious principle, to apply one test over others or, in some
cases, to apply all three.
E. Religious Accommodation
While Everson v. Board of Education's early rendering of the Estab-
lishment Clause relied on Thomas Jefferson's famous wall of separa-
tion metaphor-holding that the "wall must be kept high and im-
72 Id. at 593.
73 Id. at 597.
74 Id. at 593.
75 Id. at 593.
76 See, e.g., id. at 598-99 (holding that failure to meet the coercion test is sufficient to show
an Establishment Clause violation); see also Henry, supra note 55, at 453 ("[A] ccording to Lee, in
addition to the practices forbidden by Lemon as modified by Allegheny, the Establishment Clause
also prohibits direct or indirect coercion of individuals to participate in religion, as well as any
tie between the state and religion that tends to convey the message of approval of religion.").
77 In Newdow, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained:
We are free to apply any or all of the three tests .... The Supreme Court has not
repudiated Lemon; in Santa Fe, it found that the application of each of the three tests pro-
vided an independent ground for invalidating the statute at issue in that case; and in Lee,
the Court invalidated the policy solely on the basis of the coercion test.
Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 2002).
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pregnable" 78-the decision in the case belied that rendering. In that
case, the Court upheld a local ordinance that permitted parents to
deduct from their state tax returns the cost of busing their children
to private schools, including parochial schools.79 AsJames E. McBride
comments, the decision offered up "one of the most remarkable
twists in the history of [the] Supreme Court." ° And since Everson, the
Court has adopted an increasingly accommodative stance toward
government interaction with religion."' Indeed, as McBride aptly ex-
plains:
While the invocation ofJefferson's metaphor appears to provide a defini-
tive boundary between religion and government, the history of Estab
lishment Clause jurisprudence has born witness to its deconstruction.
The wall has been eroding from the very moment of its inception; it is as.... 82
if the wall cannot exist without its breach.
Substantial erosion of the wall of separation and the adoption of
what is seen as accommodationist logic are particularly notable in
cases involving government funding that flows to religious institu-
tions.83 The Court has advanced the view that when government pro-
vides aid in a neutral fashion-that is, without regard to religion-the
flow of that aid to religious institutions does not necessarily run afoul
of the First Amendment.84 Following the logic that "religious institu-
tions need not be quarantined from public benefits that are neutrally
available to all, 8 5 the Court has authorized, for example, laws that
have (1) loaned secular textbooks to children in parochial schools;
86
(2) permitted parents to deduct from state tax returns tuition, text-
books, and transportation costs associated with sending children to
78 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
79 Id. at 17.
80 McBride, supra note 58, at 1470.
8i See, e.g., John W. Huleatt, Comment, Accommodation or Endorsement? Stark v. Independent
School District: Caught in the Tangle of Establishment Clause Chaos, 72 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 657, 657
(1998) ("Recent cases indicate the Court is moving from a strict separation of church and state
to a more accommodationist approach.").
82 McBride, supra note 58, at 1470.
83 See, e.g., Jennifer D. Dougherty, Note, Agostini v. Felton: Sanctioning a Trend in the Accom-
modation of Educational Services for Underprivileged and Disabled Children, 29 SETON HALL L. REv.
1008, 1035-36 (1999) (arguing that in its ruling in Agostini, "the Court has announced a stan-
dard that will more readily accommodate statutes that can avoid entanglement between church
and state").
84 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997) (holding that a federally funded pro-
gram providing remedial instruction to disadvantaged children in parochial schools is not a
violation of the Establishment Clause); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3
(1993) (holding that a government funded program providing money for a sign language in-
terpreter to accompany a deaf child to classes at a Roman Catholic high school is not a violation
of the Establishment Clause).
85 Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 746 (1976).
86 Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968).
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sectarian schools; 7 (3) provided annual subsidies directly to relig-
iously affiliated colleges and universities; 8 and (4) granted funding
for a deaf student to bring to his Roman Catholic high school a state-
employed sign-language interpreter. 9 In each of these instances, the
sustained program distributed aid without reference to religious af-
filiation. In such circumstances, funding programs do not, the Court
has ruled, impermissibly advance religion through the creation of "a
financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination. "9 As the
Court has explained, " [t] his incentive is not present ... where the aid
is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor
nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and
secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis."91
Advancing this logic in a particularly notable accommodationist
move, the Court in Agostini v. Felton upheld a New York City program
that authorized public school teachers to offer remedial education to
eligible students in private schools. 92 In so doing, the Court reversed
its 1985 decision in Aguilar v. Felton,93 handed down twelve years ear-
lier, which found the same program constitutionally deficient.
Abandoning Aguilar, the Agostini Court emphasized again the neutral
and nonpreferential character of the challenged aid program. But
moving even further, the Court explained that Establishment Clause
law had changed since its 1985 holding.94 Importantly, the Court an-
nounced its departure from the previously relied upon rule "that all
government aid that directly assists the educational function of reli-
gious schools is invalid."95 The Court also noted its departure from
earlier holdings that presumed "that the placement of public em-
ployees on parochial school grounds inevitably results in the imper-
missible effect of state-sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a sym-
bolic union between government and religion."9  With these
modifications of the rationale driving earlier cases, the Court over-
turned Aguilar,97 a case that Justice Scalia once described as "hostile to
our national tradition of accommodation. '"98
87 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 391 (1983).
88 Roemer, 426 U.S. at 736.
89 Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3.
90 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 209.
93 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
94 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 237.
95 Id. at 225.
96 Id. at 223.
97 Id. at 235. Agostini also overturned portions of School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
521 U.S. at 235.
98 Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 750 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Consistent with this accommodationist approach, and especially
relevant to the instant analysis, is the Court's decision in Bowen v.
Kendrick.9 There, the Court took up a facial challenge to the Adoles-
cent Family Life Act ("AFLA"), a federal grant program that funded
services related to adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy. Under
AFLA, organizations that provided care for pregnant adolescents or
offered services to prevent adolescent sexual relations could apply for
and receive federal funding.'00 Furthermore, AFLA encouraged an
integrated approach to the provision of services that included, among
other things, religious organizations.'01 In so doing, AFLA thereby
permitted funding of religiously affiliated organizations. Rejecting
the facial challenge brought against AFLA, °2 the Court argued that
religious institutions are not "disabled by the First Amendment from
participating in publicly sponsored social welfare programs,"' 3 even
when the social welfare program entails education and counseling
provided by religious organizations to adolescents. A statute is not
invalid, the Court held, merely because "it authorizes 'teaching' by
religious grant recipients on 'matters [that] are fundamental ele-
ments of religious doctrine,' such as the harm of premarital sex and
the reasons for choosing adoption over abortion." The Court justi-
fied this holding with the following rationale:
On an issue as sensitive and important as teenage sexuality, it is not sur-
prising that the Government's secular concerns would either coincide or
conflict with those of religious institutions. But the possibility or even the
likelihood that some of the religious institutions who receive AFLA fund-
ing will agree with the message that Congress intended to deliver to ado-
lescents through the AFLA is insufficient to warrant a finding that the
statute on its face has the primary effect of advancing religion. Nor does
the alignment of the statute and the religious views of the grantees run
afoul of our proscription against "fund[ing] a specifically religious activ-
ity in an otherwise substantially secular setting." The facially neutral pro-
jects authorized by the AFLA-including pregnancy testing, adoption
counseling and referral services, prenatal and postnatal care, educational
services, residential care, child care, consumer education, etc.-are not
487 U.S. 589, 593-94 (1988).
100 Id.
101 Grant applicants must specify how they will, "as appropriate in the provision of services [,]
involve families of adolescents[, and] involve religious and charitable organizations." Id. at 596
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(a) (21) (1982)).
102 The Court did not conclude on the merits of the "as applied" challenge and instead re-
manded the case for reconsideration by the district court. The Court admitted that there was
some evidence in the record showing "specific incidents of impermissible behavior by AFLA
grantees." Id. at 620. Nevertheless, the Court remanded for a determination as to whether in
particular cases AFIA aid funded "pervasively sectarian" institutions or funded religious activi-
ties in a setting that was otherwise substantially secular. Id. at 620-21.
103 Id. at 609.
104 Id. at 612 (quoting Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1562 (D.D.C. 1987)).
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themselves "specifically religious activities," and they are not converted
into such activities by the fact that they are carried out by organizations
with religious affiliations.1
05
In so holding, Bowen explicitly rejected the proposition that the
First Amendment prohibits a legislative judgment that religious or-
ganizations can help solve certain secular problems:
6
Particularly when, as Congress found, "prevention of adolescent sexual
activity and adolescent pregnancy depends primarily upon developing
strong family values and close family ties," it seems quite sensible for
Congress to recognize that religious organizations can influence values
and can have some influence on family life, including parents' relations
with their adolescent children. To the extent that this congressional rec-
ognition has any effect of advancing religion, the effect is at most "inci-
dental and remote." 1°7
The accommodationist approach advanced in Bowen, like that put
forward in Agostini and a host of other decisions, might be seen as in-
viting, or at least permitting, just the kind of reliance on religious or-
ganizations manifest by trial court judges who send minors to Say-A-
Life. Clearly, if we are to conclude that this counseling mandate runs
afoul of the First Amendment, we must distinguish it from practices
permitted by operative precedent.
II. MANDATED SAV-A-LIFE COUNSELING IN ALABAMA
A. The Alabama Parental Consent Statute
In 1987, the Alabama legislature enacted a one-parent consent re-
quirement for unemancipated minors under eighteen years of age.
0 8
The statute includes a waiver provision that facially satisfies standing
Establishment Clause precedent'0 and precedent governing parental
consent mandates."0 According to this provision, a pregnant minor
who elects not to or cannot obtain parental consent for an abortion
may petition the juvenile court or a court of equal standing for a
105 Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
106 The Court noted that nothing in prior precedent prevents Congress "from recognizing
the important part that religion or religious organizations may play in resolving certain secular
problems." Id. at 607.
107 Id. (citation omitted).
108 See 1987 Ala. Acts 87-286 § 3.
109 Nothing on the face of the Alabama parental consent statute makes reference to religion.
SeeALA. CODE § 26-21-1 to -8 (2003).
10 See, e.g., Ex parte Anonymous, 531 So. 2d 901, 904 (Ala. 1988) ("The standards under
which the juvenile or other trial court is to decide whether to waive the [parental] consent re-
quirement are specifically set out in Bellotti II and are exactly those found in our parental con-
sent act. .. .")
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waiver of that consent."' The Act incorporates procedural guarantees
governing the waiver process. A court designated to handle waiver
petitions must proceed expeditiously 12 and confidentially,"' and must
advise the minor of her right to court-appointed counsel. 14 Those
minors who fail to secure a waiver of parental consent must be of-
fered the opportunity to pursue an "expedited confidential and
anonymous appeal.""5
With respect to the substance of the minor's petition, the Act
stipulates that parental consent "shall be waived if the court finds ei-
ther: (1) That the minor is mature and well-informed enough to
make the abortion decision on her own; or (2) That performance of
the abortion would be in the best interest of the minor.""16 A court
that renders a decision on a waiver petition must "issue written and
specific factual findings and legal conclusions supporting its deci-
sion.""17 Beyond these parameters, the Act offers no substantive guid-
ance for how judges should make their factual findings or arrive at
their legal conclusions. Though Alabama appellate court rulings
provide some guidance,"" by and large juvenile court judges retain
the freedom to devise their own standards. 9
I ALA. CODE § 26-21-3(e). The minor may petition the court in the county in which she
resides or the county in which the abortion is to be performed. Id.
112 Id. § 26-21-4(e) ("Court proceedings shall be given such precedence over other pending
matters as is necessary to insure that the court may reach a decision promptly, but in no case,
except as provided herein, shall the court fail to rule within 72 hours of the time the petition is
filed, Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays excluded.").
I" Id. § 26-21-4(i).
.4 Id. § 26-21-4(b).
15 Id. § 26-21-4(h) ("If notice of appeal is given, the record of appeal shall be completed and
the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of the notice of appeal.").
ItS Id. § 26-21-4(f).
17 Id. § 26-21- 4 (g).
118 Since the Alabama parental consent provision took effect, more than forty-five appellate
decisions have been handed down in cases involving challenges by minors to trial court deci-
sions denying waiver requests.
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has handed down most of these decisions. See, e.g., In re
Anonymous, 812 So. 2d 1218 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001); In reAnonymous, 771 So. 2d 1043 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2000); In re Anonymous, 733 So. 2d 429 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999); In re Anonymous, 684 So.
2d 1337 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996); In re Anonymous, 597 So. 2d 225 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992); In re
Anonymous, 515 So. 2d 1254 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987). Hearing appeals of some of these decisions,
the Supreme Court of Alabama has handed down another eleven rulings in waiver cases. See,
e.g., ExparteAnonymous, 808 So. 2d 1030 (Ala. 2001); ExparteAnonymous, 595 So. 2d 499 (Ala.
1992); Ex parte Anonymous, 531 So. 2d 901, 905 (Ala. 1988). For an analysis of some of these
appeals, see Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Case Note, When is a Pregnant Minor Mature? When is an Abor-
tion in her Best Interests? The Ohio Supreme Court Applies Ohio's Abortion Parental Notification Law: In
re Jane Doe 1, 566 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 1991), 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 907, 933 (1992) ("Two state ap-
pellate court decisions applying Alabama's abortion parental consent statute have fleshed out to
some degree the key concept of 'maturity.'"); Helena Silverstein, The View from the Bench:
Judging Parental Consent Bypass Requests in Alabama (Mar. 2001) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) (explaining how Alabama appellate courts have elaborated standards for
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B. Judicial Implementation of the Waiver Option
With respect to determining whether a minor is sufficiently in-
formed to make the abortion decision without parental guidance, the
available evidence120 suggests that Alabama juvenile court judges seek
to discover her familiarity with the medical aspects of the abortion
procedure, including its side effects and potential complications. 2'
determining a minor's maturity and best interests and how trial courts often construct their
own standards during waiver hearings).
119 See, e.g., Helena Silverstein, In the Matter of Anonymous, a Minor: Fetal Representation in Hear-
ings to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 11 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POLY 69, 69-70 (2001-2002)
("The meaning of 'mature and informed' is a contested matter played out time and again in
waiver of parental consent hearings, and what counts as the 'best interest' of a pregnant minor
is fashioned by trial court judges and state appellate courts that hear appeals of denied waivers.
Even with the oversight of the appeals process, how trial judges conduct waiver hearings is,
within certain broadly defined boundaries, a matter of substantial discretion.") (footnote omit-
ted).
120 Since waiver hearings are closed and the transcripts of those hearings are sealed, public
information on the waiver process is hard to come by. Therefore, interviews with those involved
in waiver proceedings offer a window into a largely concealed arena. Because this Article is part
of a larger project on judicial waiver proceedings in Alabama, the data presented here is de-
rived from interviews and phone contacts conducted at different stages of research. The first
stage of interviews, conducted between March and July 2001, aimed to elicit general informa-
tion about the waiver process, including, for example, the types of questions judges and lawyers
ask minors at hearings, the role played by judges, attorneys, and witnesses, the frequency of
grants and denials, etc. The stage-one interviews were semi-structured phone interviews, averag-
ing about forty-five minutes in length. Twenty-eight people in Alabama participated in those
interviews, including judges, court intake officers, attorneys representing minors, attorneys ap-
pointed to represent the fetus, and abortion providers.
During the second stage of the project, phone contacts were made between September and
October 2001 with each of the courts responsible for handling waiver petitions in Alabama's
sixty-seven counties. Each of these contacts began with the juvenile courts of each county. In
seeking to determine whether the courts are prepared to handle waiver inquiries, we ap-
proached the courts in accordance with how a pregnant teen might initiate such an inquiry. In
what follows, we draw to some extent on the findings derived from these contacts, but our
analysis does not rely heavily on this material. For more information on the methods of the
second stage, see Helena Silverstein & Leanne Speitel, "Honey, I Have No Idea": Court Readiness
to Handle Petitions to Waive Parental Consent for Abortion, 88 IOWA L. REV. 75, 85-88 (2002).
From data gathered during the first two stages of research, we learned about the practice of
sending minors to obtain pro-life counseling from Sav-A-Life. To further examine this practice,
in July 2003, Helena Silverstein visited ten crisis pregnancy centers in Alabama to conduct inter-
views with the directors of these organizations. The interviews were semi-structured and open-
ended. Most lasted about an hour. We sought out interviews with the directors of crisis preg-
nancy centers located in and around the counties where judges require pro-life counseling. Six
interviews were conducted with Sav-A-Life affiliates; three interviews were conducted with the
directors of non-Say-A-Life centers.
In the discussion that follows, we do not identify the names of those interviewed. We refer-
ence the information obtained during stages one and three of our research as "Interview" and
the information obtained during stage two as "Phone Contact."
121 For example, one attorney explained in typical fashion that "[tihe court wants to hear
how the procedure is performed, what the risks are including sterility, death, bleeding, infertil-
ity, suicide attempts, depression, post-traumatic stress. They want [the minor] to understand
everything about this procedure." Telephone Interview with Attorney representing minors in
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Judges are interested in learning whether the minor has plans for se-
curing a safe abortion and for handling complications that might
arise following the procedure.1 2 2 Judges generally also want to know
whether the minor is aware of alternatives to abortion and whether
she knows about assistance available for women who wish to carry
their pregnancies to term. 3 In addition, some juvenile court judges
explore a minor's views on the psychological and emotional aspects
of abortion.
1 2 4
While a minor might testify knowledgeably about all of these sub-
jects, some judges place weight on the source of a minor's informa-
tion. Some judges require that minors receive counseling on the
medical aspects of abortion from the performing physician, maintain-
ing that acquiring medical information from other sources will not
suffice. For example, ajudge in Jefferson County denied a waiver pe-
tition in part because the minor had not consulted with the physician
who would perform the abortion. 25 Although the minor testified that
she had talked to her pediatrician about the procedure, the judge
ruled this guidance inadequate.
2 6
Other judges argue that to be well-informed a minor must receive
counseling not only from those who work at abortion clinics, but also
from those who oppose abortion. Interviews with those involved in
the waiver process reveal that at least four judges in three Alabama
counties condition waiver grants on the receipt of pro-life counseling
from a crisis pregnancy center called Sav-A-Life. 27 In these counties,
Ala. (June 1, 2001). In addition to interviews, appellate court rulings in Alabama illustrate the
types of questions posed to minors at waiver hearings. See appellate court cases cited supra note
118.
122 The minor's attorney will ask, for example, "Have you made your plans about what you'll
do if there are complications? Where are you going to stay afterwards? What are you going to
do if suddenly you have to go the hospital?" Telephone Interview with Ala. Juvenile Court
Judge (June 1, 2001).
According to an attorney who acts as guardian for fetuses in waiver hearings, "I ask them
about alternatives: raising it themselves, adoption, Catholic social services, there are a number
of agencies that will take the child.... I try to get them to think if there are alternatives." Tele-
phone Interview with Ala. Attorney who acts as guardian ad litem for the fetus (May 23, 2001).
124 Consider, for instance, the following explanation offered by an Alabama juvenile court
judge who denied a minor's waiver petition:
[T] his Court had concerns about the petitioner's lack of any knowledge about the possi-
ble long-term psychological effects of abortion. This petitioner was not informed about
the possibility of negative long-term effects. Petitioner referred to the procedure as "kill-
ing the child." She did not seem to be aware or concerned that there could be any nega-
tive consequences.
Exarte Anonymous, 808 So. 2d 1030, 1033 (Ala. 2001).
Id.
126 According to the judge, "As the pediatrician was not the physician performing the proce-
dure and was in a different field of medicine, this Court did not believe this was sufficient to
inform petitioner regarding her particular procedure." Id.
127 Interview with Director of Say-A-Life Affiliate 1, in Ala. (July 24, 2003); Phone Contact
with Ala. County Juvenile Court (Oct. 10, 2001); Telephone Interview with Ala. Juvenile Court
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Sav-A-Life counseling has become a routine component of the judi-
cial waiver process. As a judge in one of these counties explained, to
determine whether a minor satisfies the criteria for obtaining a waiver
of consent,
[t]here are several factors involved, there are agencies that need to
be involved to counsel with and talk with this person. They used to be
called Sav-A-Life, maybe it's the same now. She has to talk to them about
what her options are. There is a hearing that has to be conducted; the
burden is on her to prove that she has considered medical, emotional,
psychological issues .... 128
A second judge explained that he, along with one of his fellow
judges, "will want [the minors] to have been to Sav-A-Life, to see what
there is to help them make the right decision."' 9 Asked whether
proof of a minor being well-informed depends on such a visit, this
judge replied, "I would say yes, but normally rather than simply deny,
when that's happened in the past I've said go to Say-A-Life, and the
girl did go to Sav-A-Life, and I granted the waiver. But they know
we're going to ask that so they've been to Sav-A-Life before the hear-
ing."'
In addition to the accounts of these judges, actions taken in vari-
ous cases indicate that judges require Sav-A-Life counseling. For in-
stance, one judge refused to grant a waiver request in part on the
grounds that the minor had not secured counseling from a pro-life• • 131
organization. In other instances where minors did not pursue pro-
Judge, supra note 122; Telephone Interview with Attorney representing minors in Ala., supra
note 121. In a fourth county, a court intake officer explained,
part of the ruling that the judge makes, there's a couple of things he has to take into
consideration. Is she mature enough to make an informed decision? The attorneys want
to make sure that she can say she's informed. So they may send her to Say-A-Life and
talk with the folks at Sav-A-Life. Not that they want her to not choose an abortion. But
so she could say to the judge, yes I talked to this person and this is what they explained to
me. And I understand my options. And then we'd have a hearing.
Phone Contact with Ala. CountyJuvenile Court (Sept. 24, 2001).
128 Phone Contact with Ala. County Juvenile Court, supra note 127. This judge went on to
provide the name and phone number of the local Sav-A-Life affiliate. Id. The remarks of the
director of the Say-A-Life affiliate located in this county confirm that judges sometimes send
minors for counseling: "We had a girl that came in for counseling and the judge required her
to come to us before he would grant her a waiver," Interview with Director of Say-A-Life Affili-
ate 2, in Ala. (July 22, 2003).
12 Telephone Interview with Ala. Juvenile CourtJudge, supra note 122.
130 Id.
131 See In re Anonymous, 733 So. 2d 429 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (overturning a ruling by the
trial court that denied a minor's waiver request on the grounds that she was not mature and
well-informed, and that the abortion was not in her best interest). The ruling does not specifi-
cally refer to Sav-A-Life as the required counseling center to which the judge referred the mi-
nor, but information gathered in interviews indicates that Sav-A-Life was in fact specified. Tele-
phone Interview with Attorney representing minors in Ala. (Apr. 23, 2001); Telephone
Interview with Ala. Juvenile Court Judge, supra note 122. The ruling states that the juvenile
courtjudge concluded that the minor had failed to demonstrate maturity in part by "her failure
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life counseling in advance of a waiver hearing, the judge ordered a
continuance so that the minors could receive Sav-A-Life counseling.
3 2
While judges do not, to our knowledge, demand documentation
that a minor has received Sav-A-Life counseling, the questioning a
minor faces at her waiver hearing includes inquiries into whether she
sought out such counseling. According to one judge,
Her lawyer will generally ask her, "What have you done? Did you go
to Sav-A-Life? Have you considered the alternatives to abortion?... Have
you heard both sides of the story, have you heard the pro-choice side and
the pro-life side?" So, questions are to show that she's informed. 33
Minors typically learn about this judicial requirement from attor-
neys appointed to represent them or from court intake officers who
guide them through the waiver process. The judges "want the girls to
go to Sav-A-Life," an attorney who represents minors during waiver
proceedings said.3 4  "I tell my girls this, and I tell them you can go
and listen to what they have to say at Say-A-Life, or we can appeal
that. Most just go and get it over with.... I haven't had a girl say,
'No, I won't go' and instead challenge it. ",13 Another attorney ex-
plained that some juvenile court judges "want to make sure [the mi-
nor] has spoken with pro-life agencies. That is a requirement, not an
option.... Intake will send [the minor] to a pro-life agency, because
they know the judges will want it.' 36 After expressing the view that
this requirement goes beyond the bounds of established legal prece-
dent, this attorney said, "[T]hat doesn't change the reality that if that
girl doesn't go to a pro-life agency before coming to that courtroom,
she's not going to get her waiver. If intake doesn't send her, I will.
In [the judge's] view it's an informed decision if they go ....
The argument put forward in favor of requiring pro-life counsel-
ing usually emphasizes the importance of hearing all sides of the
to seek counseling from a facility that opposes abortion." In re Anonymous, 733 So. 2d at 431.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama reversed this ruling, explaining that "[a]lthough our
supreme court has stated that a minor who does seek the advice of a pro-choice advocate thereby
demonstrates maturity, it has never stated the converse-that a minor who does not seek the ad-
vice of a group opposed to abortion thereby demonstrates immaturity." Id. (citation omitted).
Despite this reversal, the juvenile court judge continues to require pro-life counseling. Tele-
phone Interview with Ala.Juvenile CourtJudge, supra note 122.
132 Telephone Interview with Attorney representing minors in Ala., supra note 121; Tele-
phone Interview with Ala. Attorney who acts as guardian ad litem for the fetus, supra note 123.
1s3 Telephone Interview with Ala. Juvenile Court Judge, supra note 122. Some of the attor-
neys who participate in waiver hearings confirmed that minors face questions about whether
they have visited a pro-life organization. For instance, according to one attorney, "I usually ask
if they've been to any pro-life agencies." Telephone Interview with Ala. Attorney who acts as
guardian ad litem for the fetus, supra note 123.
1 Telephone Interview with Attorney representing minors in Ala., supra note 131.
135 Id.
3 Telephone Interview with Attorney representing minors in Ala., supra note 121.
137 Id.
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abortion debate. 38  Should a minor receive counseling only from an
abortion clinic, the argument goes, the information will be slanted in
favor of abortion. Though a minor might learn the technical aspects
of abortion from an abortion provider, the information will likely
downplay the negative side of abortion. In addition, pro-life counsel-
ing will likely stress the alternatives to abortion and prove more in-
formative on how to pursue those alternatives. A lawyer who has rep-
resented the interests of the fetus at waiver hearings defended the
pro-life counseling requirement this way: "I think it's appropriate
that she gets both sides of the issue, if she goes to the abortion clinic
she gets a slant. If she goes to a pro-life clinic she gets a slant from
that side."' Similarly, the director of a Say-A-Life affiliate explained,
"The family court judge calls occasionally and refers someone to
us.... They know we tell the truth and present all the information
about all the options."'40
C. Sav-A-Life, Inc.
Pregnant women in search of a Sav-A-Life center will find thirty-
three affiliate offices in Alabama.14 ' The largest crisis pregnancy or-
ganization in Alabama,'42 Sav-A-Life, Inc., was established in 1980.'"
Providing "positive alternatives to young women facing unplanned
pregnancies,"" this non-profit organization offers free pregnancy
tests and guidance on how to pursue alternatives to abortion.' Like
other crisis pregnancy centers ("CPCs"), branch offices of Sav-A-Life
frequently offer assistance with such things as maternity clothing,
l3 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Ala. Attorney who acts as guardian ad litem for the fetus,
supra note 123; Telephone Interview with Ala. Juvenile CourtJudge, supra note 122 (supporting
the idea that hearing all sides is important in making an informed decision).
139 Telephone Interview with Ala. Attorney who acts as guardian ad litem for the fetus, supra
note 123. The practice of appointing an attorney to act as guardian ad litern for the fetus has
been adopted by some of the same judges who require pro-life counseling. The constitutional-
ity of fetal representation in waiver hearings is taken up elsewhere. See Silverstein, supra note
119, at 91-108.
10 Interview with Director of Sav-A-Life Affiliate 1, in Ala., supra note 127.
141 See Sav-A-Life, Inc., Sav-A-Life Affiliates (on file with author). Sav-A-Life also has more
than twenty offices in Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee. Id. Affiliate of-
fices operate independently of each other, but each accepts a "common Statement of Faith and
Guiding Principles." See Sav-A-Life, Inc., About Us [hereinafter Sav-A-Life, About Us] (on file
with author) (establishing Mission Statement and goals of Say-A-Life).
142 Beyond Sav-A-Life affiliates, we found ten other crisis pregnancy centers ("CPCs") in Ala-
bama. See infra Part IV.C.
143 See Sav-A-Life, About Us, supra note 141.
144 Id.
145 See Sav-A-Life, Home Page, supra note 20.
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baby clothing, toys, diapers, formula, and other child-rearing accesso-
ries.
Say-A-Life's mission is unambiguously religious. A self-described
"non-denominational, Christ-centered ministry,""47 Say-A-Life's mis-
sion, according to the most recent version of the organization's Web
site, "is to establish and equip Pregnancy Centers in order that com-
munities will be reached for Christ and that abortion will be made
unnecessary and undesirable in their region. ' , 41 Sav-A-Life aims to
accomplish this through "a commitment to evangelism and Biblical
Truth."
Affiliate offices of Sav-A-Life adhere to the organization's religious
mission. For example, according to the Web site of Sav-A-Life East,
Inc., located in Birmingham,
We are an evangelical Christian ministry and our volunteers come
from many different denominations which agree on the basic tenants
[sic] of the Christian faith. An emphasis is placed on the belief that God
loves every client that walks into our office, unconditionally, right where
she is. Our first concern is for her, a possible pregnancy and baby is sec-
ondary. Each is a Divine appointment and our volunteers must feel
called to this ministry and make it a high priority in their life.150
Other Sav-A-Life affiliates include prayer recommendations on
their Web sites. While some, such as the West Alabama Sav-A-Life,
put this recommendation forward only in general terms,' others
provide specific prayer advice. For example, the Pregnancy Test Cen-
ter in Oneonta offers on its website a discussion of abortion that rec-
ommends that pregnant women
review the fetal development of the baby to see that it is truly a new life
which is not your own. If you are a Christian, you should consider what
God's word (the Bible) says about abortion. God says, "I have set before
you life or death, so choose life.'
146 Id.
147 See Sav-A-Life, About Us, supra note 141.
1 Sav-A-Life, Inc., Our Mission (on file with author).
149 See Sav-A-Life, About Us, supra note 141. An earlier rendition of Sav-A-Life's Web site ex-
plained that the services offered by the organization include "Evangelism, Discipleship and Bi-
ble Study." See Sav-A-Life, Home Page, supra note 20.
150 Say-A-Life E., Inc., Be a Volunteer, at http://www.savalifeeast.org/volunteer.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 27, 2004). The website further states: "We believe when a mother is given truthful,
positive information about the development of the unborn baby and what an abortion will do to
it, along with God's unconditional love, she will be better equipped to make a choice that she
will not later regret." Say-A-Life E., Inc., About Us, at http://www.savalifeeast.org/about.htm
(last visited Oct. 27, 2004).
151 See W. Ala. Sav-A-Life (advising those wishing to serve the organization to "pray consis-
tently for Sav-A-Life"), at http://www.westal.net/sav-a-life/page2.htm (last visited Oct. 27,
2004).
152 OurChurch.com, Oneonta Pregnancy Test Center (on file with author).
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A listing of eight Bible verses follows this recommendation, including
Jeremiah 1:5, "Before I formed you in the womb I knew you," and
Exodus 23:7, "do not put an innocent.., person to death. '
Further evidence of the overarching religious mission of Sav-A-
Life comes from information gathered during on-site interviews with
directors of six Sav-A-Life affiliates. 54 The interviews reveal that these
CPCs ground their counseling on religious principles, and counselors
seek to realize the organization's evangelical mission by witnessing to
clients and sharing the gospel.
According to the director of one affiliate, "Our mission is to share
the gospel of Lord Jesus Christ with women who are in crisis preg-
nancy and to do that with services we offer.' 15 Although the director
made clear that no one is "forced" to hear the gospel, she said, "We
seek to share the gospel with everyone who walks through the
door."'156 The director further explained, "There are 100,000 ways to
do that. A lot of times at root I say I'm interested in her as a woman,
as a person. But I'm interested in her spiritual well-being. So I sim-
ply, I'll ask about her relationship with Christ, where she stands in
her thinking.'
157
In response to the query of how those facing unwanted pregnan-
cies are counseled, a second director commented,
All of our counsel is from a biblical basis. Our view is that the Bible is
true. All our counselors are Christian. All our counsel is based on what
He says, that is, what God says. And God for us is Jesus. All our counsel
is based on the word of God....
... We tell her that God loves her, that He has blessed her if the test
is positive, even if it may not look like a blessing.
5
1
After further explaining that counseling of pregnant women can em-
phasize the emotional, physical, and spiritual aspects of abortion, this
director went on to say that the counselors at her organization em-
phasize spirituality. "We're very evangelical. We present the gospel
to them.... [W]e keep track of who has received Christ. We ask
about spirituality, whether they believe in Christ, whether they're an
unbeliever, whether they've committed their life to Christ."' Fur-
thermore, this director remarked that women are told, "God can turn
this around if she lets 'them. God has allowed the sperm and the egg
to unite.... Also there's another force and that's Satan and he's
153 Id.
15 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
155 Interview with Director of Say-A-Life Affiliate 3, in Ala. (July 21, 2003).
156 Id.
157 Id.
15 Interview with Director of Sav-A-Life Affiliate 4, in Ala. (July 21, 2003).
159 Id.
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looking to kill and destroy, and Satan is trying to get a foothold in
their lives."16
The director of a third Sav-A-Life affiliate explained the organiza-
tion's evangelical mission in this way: "We're a Christian ministry and
we share the gospel. God doesn't have to hold anybody down. Jesus
is a gentleman. He knocks. I can't change a heart or a life, but I can
introduce them to someone who can change a heart or a life., 61 De-
scribing the method adopted to share the gospel, this director said:
We use evangelism explosion here. It was introduced by D.J. Ken-
nedy of Coral Ridge Presbyterian Church in Florida. It's a method of
evangelism. There are several different methods. In this one we ask, If
you die tonight, will you go to heaven?... And then we say God loves
them. No man is perfect. Jesus was perfect. God loves them but he'sjust
and will punish sins. We tell them .... Jesus lived a perfect life, and he
died on the cross. He paid the debt for our sins. He rose on the third
day. We accept that in faith and whatJesus did on the cross will get us to
heaven. 162
At a fourth Sav-A-Life affiliate, the director remarked that while
the spiritual emphasis of counseling might vary from client to client,
"We witness to every client we counsel. We witness to every client at
least once. 163 Asked to elaborate on what witnessing involves, this di-
rector said,
We have gospel tracts we go by. We're all different denominations so
we do different things. But we stick to the basic plan of salvation. There
are a lot of differences between what I believe and what a Catholic be-
lieves. But we ask them if they believe in heaven or hell and if they die
will they go to heaven or hell and if they've received God. We'll show the
Bible and [say the] only help is [a] relationship with Jesus Christ and
they can accept that or they can not. If they accept, we give them a Bible
and we try to get them to go to church.' 64
A client who expresses the view that she will go to heaven because she
is a good person will be told that gaining entry to heaven requires
more. In particular, counselors at this affiliate tell clients that ac-
ceptinglesus Christ as one's savior is necessary for admission into
heaven.
The director of another Sav-A-Life affiliate said,
We provide services for free so that we can show God's love and can share
with them God's word. We don't push them to receive Christ. We tell
160 Id.
161 Interview with Director of Sav-A-Life Affiliate 5, in Ala. (July 22, 2003).
162 Id.
163 Interview with Director of Sav-A-Life Affiliate 2, supra note 128.
164 Id.
155 Id.
166 Id.
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them you can do it today or at home at night. We have a tract that we'll
go over with them. I'll give them a choice. Do you want me to lead them
in a prayer. I'll tell them how to contact church.
11
7
By way of further explaining the organization's religious mission, this
director shared the following anecdote:
We had a situation where a boyfriend called, and he complained that we
talked to his girlfriend about her relationship with God and church. He
said religion is a private thing. I said, you know, your girlfriend came in
and read the intake form and knew that we're a Christian ministry. The
reason the church supports us and gives us money is because we're going
to talk about God. You telling us not to talk aboutjesus Christ is like go-
ing to PapaJohn's [Pizza] and asking for ice cream.
Several directors confirmed that affiliates must accept Sav-A-Life's
Statement of Faith, Guiding Principles, and Activism Policy, docu-
ments that exhibit the organization's evangelical imperative.1 69 The
Statement of Faith expresses belief in, among other things, the Old
and New Testament, the Trinity, the death of Jesus Christ for the sins
of others, the physical resurrection of Jesus Christ, and the second
coming of Christ."" Those who sign the statement "believe that all
who receive by faith the Lord Jesus Christ are born of the Holy Spirit
and thereby become children of God, and there is no other way of
salvation," and "believe in the great commission which our Lord has
given His Church to evangelize the world, and that this evangeliza-
tion is the great mission of the church." 71 Signers accept that it is
their "Christian duty to witness by word and deed to these truths.'
'
1
2
The Guiding Principles document indicates that Sav-A-Life is a
"Christian alterative [sic] to abortion ... it is our desire that we be
used of God as a tool in spreading the Good News." 73 The statement
lists twelve points, including, among other things, that the organiza-
tion "is committed to helping fulfill the Great Commission and will
endeavor to introduce its clients to Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord.'
74
167Interview with Director of Sav-A-Life Affiliate 6, in Ala. (July 21, 2003).
168 Id.
1 See, e.g., Interviews with Directors of Sav-A-Life Affiliates, supra notes 127-28, 155, 158, 161,
167. According to one director, "It's standard procedure for affiliates to sign the statement of
faith and guiding principles." Interview with Director of Sav-A-Life Affiliate 1, supra note 127.
In addition, according to the website of Sav-A-Life East, Inc., "Each Sav-A-Life affiliate is totally
independent from any other, as most Pregnancy Test Centers are. We abide by a common
Statement of Faith and Guiding Principles." Sav-A-Life E., Inc., About Us, at
http://www.savalifeeast.org/about.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2004).
170 SAV-A-LIFE, INC., STATEMENT OF FAITH 1 (2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter STATE-
MENT OF FAITH].
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 SAV-A-LIFE, INC., GUIDING PRINCIPLES 1 (2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter GUIDING
PRINCIPLES].
174 Id.
Nov. 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
The organization's Activism Policy aims primarily at ensuring that
Sav-A-Life volunteers refrain from taking part in sidewalk counseling
and rescues at abortion clinics. 175 Yet it, too, underscores the impor-
tance of the evangelical mission: "God has given Sav-A-Life the re-
sponsibility to witness, counsel, and test the women in our commu-
nity.,,176
Those who volunteer at Say-A-Life must sign each of these state-
ments. 77 Thus, as one director remarked, being Christian "is a re-
quirement" for those who wish to volunteer.178  This prerequisite is
manifest in the questions posed on a volunteer counselor application
used by at least one Sav-A-Life office. 79 Among other things, that ap-
plication form asks:
In Your Opinion, how does a person become a Christian? (Briefly ex-
plain)
What is your attitude toward personal evangelism?
Are you willing to be trained in personal evangelism?
In your words, what is Christian counseling?
18
This application form also asks prospective volunteers to write
their "personal testimony" by offering the following account:
Before I received Christ, I lived and thought this way:
How I received Christ (Please be specific):
After I received Christ, these are the changes that took place in my life:'8 '
Along with the common requirement that volunteers accept
Christ, at least some branches of Sav-A-Life track whether clients have
"received Christ.' ' 1 2 While those interviewed were not questioned as
to whether they document the number of clients who receive Christ,
some made reference to such documentation. Implying that Sav-A-
Life affiliates track and even share this information, one director said,
"Our numbers of [clients] receiving Christ are not as high as other
Sav-A-Life centers."'83 Another director presented the following data:
"Historically, about ten to twelve percent pray with us or say they've
committed their life to Christ. Over twelve years, we've given 8905
175 SAV-A-LIFE, INC., AcrvsM POLICY 1 (2004) (on file with author).
176 Id.
177 Interview with Director of Sav-A-Life Affiliate 4, supra note 158.
178 Interview with Director of Sav-A-Life Affiliate 2, supra note 128.
179 Responding to a routine question posed to all those interviewed about how Sav-A-Life af-
filiates secure volunteers to work as counselors, one of those interviewed offered to share a copy
of the volunteer counselor application used by that office. We did not, however, request the
application form used by other affiliates. Therefore, we cannot say whether all Say-A-Life affili-
ates use a similar application.I80 SAv-A-LIFE, INC., VOLUNTEER COUNSELOR APPLICATION 1-2 (2003) (on file with author).
181 Id. at 3.
182 Interview with Director of Sav-A-Life Affiliate 4, supra note 158.
183 Interview with Director of Sav-A-Life Affiliate 6, supra note 167.
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pregnancy tests; 2744 tested positive; 5749 were single; 1014 prayed to
receive Christ or commit their life to him."'
184
The physical d6cor of the Sav-A-Life affiliate offices that we visited
offers further evidence of the overtly religious character of the or-
ganization. Religious imagery is virtually ubiquitous and takes multi-
ple forms. Religious displays-including drawings, paintings, and
figurines of Jesus Christ, the Virgin Mary, and angels-grace walls,
desks, and tabletops. Bibles can typically be found in counseling
rooms. Crosses, though less prevalent than other religious symbols,
adorn the walls of some offices. Psalms, Bible verses, and other
prayers often accompany religious depictions or stand on their own.
At one office, for example, a verse from Luke appears alongside a
saccharine drawing of a young child, while at another office a large
embroidery of the Lord's Prayer hangs just outside the entry to one
of the counseling rooms.
Although we did not visit each of the Sav-A-Life offices in Ala-
bama, the information we obtained from those we did visit, combined
with the publicly available information about the organization,
plainly demonstrates that Sav-A-Life affiliate offices primarily serve to
advance the organization's Christ-centered evangelical mission. As
one director put it when explaining whether the organization might
apply for a government grant under new faith-based funding, "we
would never apply for such a grant if we thought it would compro-
mise our faith. First and foremost we're a Christian ministry."'
85
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONSIDERATIONS IN
MANDATED SAV-A-LIFE COUNSELING
We now turn to a consideration of how current Establishment
Clause precedent applies to the Sav-A-Life counseling requirement.
A. The Lemon Test
1. The Purpose Prong
To satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test, mandated Sav-A-Life
counseling must serve a secular purpose. 86  Under Lemon's first
prong, "a court may invalidate a statute only if it is motivated wholly
by an impermissible purpose."'87 Because mandated counseling from
1 Interview with Director of Say-A-Life Affiliate 4, supra note 158.
I5 interview with Director of Sav-A-Life Affiliate 1, supra note 127. Say-A-Life's Web site also
notes that the organization is "a non-profit, non-denominational, Christ-centered ministry that
receives no government funding." Sav-A-Life, About Us, supra note 141.
186 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
187 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988).
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Sav-A-Life is a judicially constructed requirement, we cannot look to
such things as the legislative record to discern the purpose behind
the requirement. We have only the specific motives of those judges
who require such counseling.
The expressed motivations of these judges are two-fold. As dis-
cussed above, judges contend that pro-life counseling, when offered
in conjunction with counseling provided by abortion clinic person-
nel, ensures balanced information on pregnancy options.88 Some
judges also acknowledge that they hope Sav-A-Life counseling will en-
courage minors to choose childbirth over abortion. As one judge ex-
plained, sending minors to Sav-A-Life will "hopefully... make them
see that abortion is not the right decision, because I believe it is the
wrong decision. ' 189
While we suspect that these judges' views are based on religious
beliefs, we lack sufficient evidence to prove this point.'90 Moreover, it
is arguable that the judges' stated goals stand up as secular whether
or not they arise from some deeper religious conviction. Whether
judges aim to ensure balanced information or to encourage child-
birth, these goals serve a secular purpose. In light of these considera-
tions, we grant, for the sake of the argument at least, that mandated
Sav-A-Life counseling passes the first prong of the Lemon test.
2. The Effects Prong
To meet Lemon's second prong, the conduct in question "must
have a ... principal or primary effect... that neither advances nor
inhibits religion."'' Among the ways in which government conduct
would impermissibly advance religion is when that conduct supports
religious indoctrination. In School District v. Ball,192 the Court ex-
plained:
Although Establishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized by few
absolutes, the Clause does absolutely prohibit government-financed or
government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular re-
ligious faith. Such indoctrination, if permitted to occur, would have dev-
1 See discussion supra Part II.B.
189 Telephone Interview with Ala.juvenile CourtJudge, supra note 122.
190 We did turn up some evidence that lends itself to the conclusion that religion inspires
some of these judges. For example, referring to one of the judges, a respondent said, "He is
very religious. And he doesn't want to grant these things." Telephone Interview with Ala. At-
torney who acts as guardian ad litem for the fetus (May 16, 2001). However, our data do not
provide adequate grounds for arriving at the conclusion that a sectarian purpose motivates the
counseling mandate.
191 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
192 Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (invalidating two educational programs in which the
Grand Rapids, Michigan public school system financed and offered classes in sectarian schools
to students of those schools).
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astating effects on the right of each individual voluntarily to determine
what to believe (and what not to believe) free of any coercive pressures
from the State, while at the same time tainting the resulting religious be-
liefs with a corrosive secularism.193
Government-sponsored religious indoctrination remains abso-
lutely forbidden under the Establishment Clause. However, the rules
for assessing the likelihood of indoctrination have been relaxed since
the Court's ruling in Ball.194 In its earlier decisions, the Court seemed
to accept the presumption that direct support of sectarian institutions
by government unjustifiably risked the inculcation of religious values
with the state's blessing.195 In more recent decisions the Court has re-
fused routine acceptance of this presumption. 9'
Particularly relevant for our discussion is the ruling in Bowen v.
Kendrick,"'97 where the Court rested its denial of the facial challenge to
AFLA in part on a rejection of this presumption. Acknowledging ear-
lier holdings that invalidated programs "that entail an unacceptable
risk that government funding would be used to 'advance the religious
mission' of the religious institution receiving aid, the Court never
theless held that Congress may fund religiously affiliated institutions
that provide education and counseling services to adolescents.
"[N]othing in our prior cases," the Court explained, "warrants the
presumption adopted by the District Court that religiously affiliated
AFLA grantees are not capable of carrying out their functions under
the AFLA in a lawful, secular manner." The Court further ex-
plained that "a relevant factor in deciding whether a particular stat-
ute on its face can be said to have the improper effect of advancing
religion is the determination of whether, and to what extent, the
statute directs government aid to pervasively sectarian institutions ., 0
Distinguishing between merely sectarian institutions and those that
are pervasively sectarian, the Court in Bowen held:
193 Id. at 385 (citations omitted).
194 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997) ("As we have repeatedly recognized, gov-
ernment inculcation of religious beliefs has the impermissible effect of advancing religion. Our
cases subsequent to Aguilar have, however, modified in two significant respects the approach we
use to assess indoctrination.").
195 In Ball for example, the Court's finding of an Establishment Clause violation rested in
part on the assumption that "any and all public aid that directly aids the educational function of
religious schools impermissibly finances religious indoctrination." Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222.
196 See, e.g., Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223 (stating that the court has abandoned the presumption
that "the placement of public employees on parochial school grounds inevitably results in the
impermissible effect of state-sponsored indoctrination").
197 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
198 Id. at 612.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 610.
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Only in the context of aid to "pervasively sectarian" institutions have we
invalidated an aid program on the grounds that there was a "substantial"
risk that aid to these religious institutions would, knowingly or unknow-
ingly, result in religious indoctrination. In contrast, when the aid is to
flow to religiously affiliated institutions that were not pervasively sectar-
ian, as in Roemer, we refused to presume that it would be used in a way
201
that would have the primary effect of advancing religion.
In so holding, the Court concluded that, as long as the religiously
affiliated grantees prove not to be "pervasively sectarian,"-that is, in-
stitutions "in which the secular cannot be separated from the sectar-
,,202ian, or, put otherwise, where "religion is so pervasive that a sub-
stantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious
mission 5-the presumption of state-sponsored religious indoctrina-
tion can be rejected. Furthermore, the Bowen Court remanded the
case with respect to whether AFLA could withstand an "as applied"
challenge: "In particular, it will be open to appellees on remand to
show that AFLA aid is flowing to grantees that can be considered
'pervasively sectarian' religious institutions, such as we have held pa-
rochial schools to be."
20 4
Bowen addresses government funding of religious organizations,
not counseling mandates. Nevertheless, the ruling demonstrates the
Court's current reluctance to presume that direct government sup-
port of sectarian organizations will inevitably lead to religious indoc-
trination, and our assessment of whether court-mandated Say-A-Life
counseling constitutes religious indoctrination must take the Court's
recent shift into account.
As it pertains to the issue of indoctrination relative to the instant
issue, the upshot of Bowen is that government may, as part of a relig-
iously neutral program, directly sponsor religiously affiliated institu-
tions with the aim of encouraging those institutions to provide educa-
tion and counseling services to adolescents.205  However, those
alleging that such sponsorship constitutes impermissible religious in-
201 Id. at 612 (citation omitted).
M Margo R. Drucker, Comment, Bowen v. Kendrick: Establishing Chastity at the Expense of Con-
stitutional Prophylactics, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1178 (1989).
203 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
M Bowen, 487 U.S. at 621. The Court also offered this guidance for approaching an "as ap-
plied" consideration: "Here it would be relevant to determine, for example, whether the Secre-
tary has permitted AFLA grantees to use materials that have an explicitly religious content or
are designed to inculcate the views of a particular religious faith." Id.
205 This is distinct from the upshot of later rulings that permit direct government sponsor-
ship of religiously affiliated institutions where the educational services are provided in the reli-
gious institutions but by public employees. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997)
(refusing to hold invalid under the Establishment Clause a federally funded program designed
to provide remedial instruction by public employees at a religious institution); Zobrest v. Cata-
lina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993) ("[T]he Establishment Clause lays down no abso-
lute bar to the placing of a public employee in a sectarian school.").
[Vol. 7:2
RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT
doctrination can show a constitutional violation by demonstrating
that the particular religious organization receiving government sup-
port is pervasively sectarian.
206
While precedent holds that religious inspiration or affiliation with
a religious institution does not by itself make an organization perva-
sively sectarian, 207 Sav-A-Life's evangelical imperative makes it impos-
sible to imagine that the sectarian character of the organization is less
than pervasive.20 ' According to the group's Statement of Faith, all af-
filiates and volunteers-who are required to sign the Statement-
"believe that all who receive by faith the Lord Jesus Christ are born of
the Holy Spirit and thereby become children of God, and there is no
other way of salvation," and "believe in the great commission which
our Lord has given His Church to evangelize the world, and that this
evangelization is the great mission of the church."0 9 Signers thereby
embrace their "Christian duty to witness by word and deed to these
truths.'10
206 While this is not the only way impermissible religious indoctrination can be proven, Bowen
explains that this is one way of establishing such proof. See supra notes 200-01 and accompany-
ing text.
207 In Bowen, the Court held that "it is not enough to show that the recipient of a challenged
grant is affiliated with a religious institution or that it is 'religiously inspired.'" Bowen, 487 U.S.
at 621. And according to standing precedent, the mere finding that an organization undertakes
a religiously based mission does not, without more, make that organization pervasively sectar-
ian. Consider in this regard cases that have upheld government funding of religiously affiliated
institutions of higher education. In Tilton v. Richardson, the Court permitted government fund-
ing of church-related colleges and universities, including several schools governed by Catholic
religious organizations (e.g., Sacred Heart University, Fairfield University, and Albertus Magnus
College). 403 U.S. 672, 686-87 (1971). In Hunt v. McNair, the Court upheld a funding pro-
gram that permitted grant allocation to the Baptist College at Charleston, an institution of
higher learning governed in part by the South Carolina Baptist Convention. 413 U.S. at 743.
In Roener v. Board of Public Works, the Court sanctioned sizable financial disbursements to four
Roman Catholic affiliated colleges located in Maryland: The College of Notre Dame, Mount
Saint Mary's College, Saint Joseph College, and Loyola College. 426 U.S. 736, 744 (1976). In
none of these cases did the Court find these institutions to be pervasively sectarian. But, with-
out doubt, these institutions have at their foundation a religious mission. For example, accord-
ing to Sacred Heart University's mission statement, the University "is Catholic in tradition and
spirit. As a Catholic university, it seeks to play its appropriate role in the modern world. It ex-
emplifies in its life the Judeo-Christian values of the God-given freedom and dignity of every
human person." Sacred Heart Univ., Mission Statement, at http://www.sacredheart.edu/
about/mission/index.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2004).
208 Our conclusion that Sav-A-Life is pervasively sectarian is not necessary to our finding that
mandated Sav-A-Life counseling from the affiliates we interviewed leads to efforts to indoctri-
nate minors. With respect to the Sav-A-Life affiliates we interviewed, the evidence concerning
the evangelical character of the counseling demonstrates that the risk of indoctrination is real.
Our conclusion that Sav-A-Life is pervasively sectarian does, however, provide the grounding to
generalize about the risk of indoctrination at all Sav-A-Life affiliates, thereby permitting us to
draw organization-wide conclusions about the constitutional effect of the counseling mandate.
209 STATEMENT OF FAITH, supra note 170, at 1.
210 Id.
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Moreover, interviews with affiliate directors leave no doubt that
Christianity guides all Sav-A-Life activities.21 1 These directors attest to
the central and indispensable role religion plays in their organiza-
tion. Indeed, these directors were not shy in revealing that the defin-
ing characteristic of their organization is sharing the gospel. As one
director put it, "Our mission is to share the gospel of Lord Jesus
Christ with women who are in crisis pregnancy and to do that with
services we offer.
2
1
2
While the meaning of "pervasively sectarian" is open to interpreta-
tion,13 if the extension of the concept depicted by the expression
does not extend to an organization committed to "introduc[ing] its
client's [sic] to Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord,, 214 then we must re-
grettably admit that we have absolutely no grasp of the meaning of
the expression.
211 See supra Part II.C.
212 Interview with Director of Sav-A-Life Affiliate 3, supra note 155.
213 As Justice Blackmun said, the notion of pervasively sectarian is "a vaguely defined term of
art." Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 631 (1988) (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy,
concurring in Bowen and acknowledging judicial precedent that considers the extent of sectari-
anism, offered this comment: "I am not confident that the term 'pervasively sectarian' is a well-
founded juridical category." Id. at 624 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Precedent does, however,
provide us with some examples of pervasively sectarian institutions. It tells us that parochial
schools at the elementary and secondary level count as pervasively sectarian institutions. See,
e.g., id. at 621 (noting that the Court has considered parochial schools to be pervasively sectar-
ian). By contrast, religiously affiliated institutions of higher education are not necessarily per-
vasively sectarian. See, e.g., Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 759 (1976) (finding the
institutions at issue "not 'so permeated by religion that the secular side cannot be separated
from the sectarian'"); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) ("[T]he Court has not ac-
cepted the recurrent argument that all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institu-
tion frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends."); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
679 (1971) ("The crucial question is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution
as a consequence of the legislative program, but whether its principal or primary effect ad-
vances religion."). The difference, the Court has said, has to do with whether religion so per-
meates the institutions that their religious and secular functions are inseparable. Roemer, 426
U.S. at 750. As Justice Thomas explained, the Court "invented the 'pervasively sectarian' test as
a way to distinguish between schools that carefully segregate religious and secular activities and
schools that consider their religious and educational missions indivisible and therefore require
religion to permeate all activities." Columbia Union Coll. v. Clark, 527 U.S. 1013, 1013 (1999)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
In addition to this distinction, precedent points to certain characteristics that can be used in
assessing the degree of sectarianism of particular institutions. According to Margo R. Drucker,
these characteristics include
whether there are religious restrictions on admission, or whether a large proportion of
attending individuals are of one religious denomination; whether there is adherence to
religious dogma; whether there is attendance at religious services; in the case of a school,
whether a particular religious doctrine is studied and whether there are restrictions on
what and how the faculty must teach; whether religious indoctrination is a substantial
purpose of the institution; whether members of religious orders direct programs; and
whether programs are conducted in rooms adorned with religious symbols.
Drucker, supra note 202, at 1178 (footnotes omitted).
214 GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 173, at 1.
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Were Bowen the sole controlling precedent, we could readily con-
clude that mandated Sav-A-Life counseling constitutes government-
sponsored religious indoctrination and hence fails the second prong
of Lemon. However, recent cases further modify the jurisprudence of
indoctrination, revealing the Court's increasing unwillingness to pre-
sume religious indoctrination-even in the context of aid that flows
to pervasively sectarian institutions.
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, the Court upheld the
use of a state-employed sign-language interpreter in a Roman Catho-
lic high school. In Agostini v. Felton, the Court allowed public
school teachers to provide remedial education and counseling to stu-
dents in parochial schools.1 16 Rejecting the presumption that publicly
employed interpreters or instructors would, by virtue of the perva-
sively sectarian surroundings, inculcate religion, the Court upheld
both of the challenged aid programs."' As the Court explained in
Zobrest, "[w] hen the government offers a neutral service on the prem-
ises of a sectarian school as part of a general program that 'is in no
way skewed towards religion,' it follows under our prior decisions that
provision of that service does not offend the Establishment Clause. 21 8
Furthermore, the Court argued that the record failed to suggest "that
a sign-language interpreter would do more than accurately interpret
whatever material is presented to the class as a whole. ,2 ' 9 The Court
presented a similar argument in Agostini:
[T] here is no reason to presume that, simply because she enters a paro-
chial school classroom, a full-time public employee such as a Title I
teacher will depart from her assigned duties and instructions and embark
on religious indoctrination, any more than there was reason in Zobrest to
think an interpreter would inculcate religion by altering her translation
of classroom lectures.2 2 9
Zobrest and Agostini significantly advance the Court's accommoda-
tionist stance. Nevertheless, it is clear that these cases do not engage
the issue of mandated Sav-A-Life counseling. Unlike the educational
services sanctioned in Zobrest and Agostini--services offered by public
employees who come to their positions not by virtue of any religious
leanings-the pro-life counseling available at Sav-A-Life is offered by
private individuals who embrace, and, indeed, are required to em-
215 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993).
216 521 U.S. 203, 208-09 (1997).
217 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 224; Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12.
218 509 U.S. at 10 (citation omitted).
219 Id. at 13.
22 521 U.S. at 226.
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brace, the evangelical mission of the ministries. 22 ' There is an enor-
mous difference between the public employees who performed secu-
lar functions for the pervasively sectarian institutions in Zobrest and
Agostini and the committed evangelicals performing arguably secular
functions in the context of the pervasively sectarian institution at is-
sue here. Zobrest and Agostini encourage faith in the ability of public
employees to avoid engaging in religious indoctrination. But they do
not speak to the behavior of committed religious employees of perva-
sively sectarian organizations. Therefore, these cases do not change
our conclusion, directed by Bowen, that mandated Sav-A-Life counsel-
ing constitutes impermissible government indoctrination of religion.
3. The Excessive Entanglement Prong
If we have rightly characterized Sav-A-Life as pervasively sectarian,
then mandated pro-life counseling fails the third prong of Lemon,
which forbids "excessive entanglement between church and state.,
2 3
Though a precise definition of "excessive entanglement" is hard to
come by in Supreme Court precedent, considerations surrounding
this prong typically attend to the tangible connections between
church and state, such as administrative oversight of religious institu-
224tions that accompanies funding programs. The Court also consid-
2 See, e.g., CARE NET, PREGNANCY CENTER AFFILIATION PACKAGE (stating the requirement
that counselors embrace Care Net's evangelical mission), at http://www.care-net.org/
membership/affiliation.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
222 The holding in Lemon does speak directly to the behavior of committed religious employ-
ees of pervasively sectarian organizations, and recent modifications in indoctrination precedent
have not altered the Lemon Court's conclusion that "[w]e cannot ignore the danger that a
teacher under religious control and discipline poses to the separation of the religious from the
purely secular aspects of pre-college education." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617 (1971).
Careful not to imply that teachers would intentionally violate the Establishment Clause, the
Lemon Court explained:
We need not and do not assume that teachers in parochial schools will be guilty of
bad faith or any conscious design to evade the limitations imposed by the statute and the
First Amendment. We simply recognize that a dedicated religious person, teaching in a
school affiliated with his or her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably
experience great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral. Doctrines and faith are not
inculcated or advanced by neutrals. With the best of intentions such a teacher would
find it hard to make a total separation between secular teaching and religious doctrine.
Id. at 618-19.
223 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988). While there has been some discussion in
recent cases as to whether the excessive entanglement consideration should be taken up sepa-
rately or as part of the effects prong of Lemon, see, e.g., Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232; supra notes 51-
52 and accompanying text, we will treat entanglement on its own.
224 See, e.g., Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 764 (1976) (discussing state audits of
religiously affiliated colleges receiving public aid); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 736 (1973)
(discussing revenue bonds benefiting a Baptist-controlled college); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672, 679 (1971) (discussing federal construction grants for church-related schools); Lemon,
403 U.S. at 607 (discussing state funding for secular education in non-public schools).
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ers government surveillance of the content of religious activities to be
problematically entangling. Thus, for example, when overturning
the two separate state funding statutes at issue in Lemon, the Court
argued that
[t] he substantial religious character of these church-related schools gives
rise to entangling church-state relationships of the kind the Religion
Clauses sought to avoid. Although the District Court found that concern
for religious values did not inevitably or necessarily intrude into the con-
tent of secular subjects, the considerable religious activities of these
schools led the legislature to provide for careful governmental controls
and surveillance by state authorities in order to ensure that state aid sup-
ports only secular education . 25
While the Court overturned as excessively entangling the statutes
under consideration in Lemon, later rulings have permitted a substan-
tial degree of interaction between government and religious institu-
tions. The Court in Bowen found "no excessive entanglement where
government reviews the adolescent counseling programs set up by re-
ligious institutions that are grantees, reviews the materials used by
such grantees, and monitors the program by periodic visits."2 2 6 The
Court in Roemer v. Board of Public Works sanctioned the flow of public
aid to four Roman Catholic affiliated colleges and rejected an exces-
sive entanglement claim even though the state conducted annual au-
dits to prevent the schools from using the grants to teach religion.227
In Agostini, the Court upheld a remedial education program provided
by public school teachers in private sectarian schools that included
unannounced monthly visits by public supervisors to prevent inculca-
tion of religion by those teachers.228
Given the degree of entanglement permitted by standing prece-
dent, there might seem to be little question that mandated Sav-A-Life
counseling survives the third prong of Lemon. While courts provide
the affiliates' names and contact information, they do not, as far as
we know, monitor these centers. In fact, it is difficult to find any tan-
25 403 U.S. at 616. Justice Brennan, concurring in Lemon, provided what may be an even
more apt characterization of the problems of entanglement:
Both the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes prescribe extensive standardization of
the content of secular courses, and of the teaching materials and textbooks to be used in
teaching the courses. And the regulations to implement those requirements necessarily
require policing of instruction in the schools. The picture of state inspectors prowling
the halls of parochial schools and auditing classroom instruction surely raises more than
an imagined specter of governmental "secularization of a creed."
Id. at 650 (Brennan, J., concurring).
226 487 U.S. at 615-17.
227 426 U.S. at 764-65.
228 521 U.S. at 234.
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gible entanglement, let alone excessive entanglement, between the
courts that mandate pro-life counseling and Sav-A-Life affiliates."
Nevertheless, the mandate fails the third Lemon prong. This fail-
ure stems, ironically, from the lack of government supervision and
from what constitutionally required government supervision would
entail. Given that evangelical Christian ministries provide the man-
dated counseling, "to ensure that religion is not advanced would re-
quire extensive and continuous monitoring and direct oversight of
every counseling session.' '3 0  But such monitoring and oversight
would create excessive entanglement, thereby violating First Amend-
ment prohibitions.3 '
This argument contributed to the district court holding in Bowen
that AFLA ran afoul of the Establishment Clause. 2  However, the ar-
gument did not in that context convince the Supreme Court to affirm
the lower court's finding. The Court acknowledged as a "Catch-22"
the argument that "the very supervision of the aid to assure that it
does not further religion renders the statute invalid."2 3 Still, the
Court did not reject the argument that a government policy necessi-
tating extensive and continuous monitoring of a religious institution
would generate excessive entanglement. 234 Instead, the Court's un-
willingness to concur with the district court's finding in Bowen turned
on the extent of religious sectarianism.
[T]here is no reason to assume that the religious organizations which
may receive grants are "pervasively sectarian" in the same sense as the
Court has held parochial schools to be. There is accordingly no reason
to fear that the less intensive monitoring involved here will cause the
Government to intrude unduly in the day-to-day operation of the relig-
iously affiliated AFLA grantees.... [I]n our view, this type of grant moni-
toring does not amount to "excessive entanglement," at least in the con-
text of a statute authorizing grants to religiously affiliated organizations
that are not necessarily "pervasively sectarian."23
Following the Court's reasoning to its conclusion and applying it
to the context of mandated counseling from Sav-A-Life, when
grounds exist for assuming that government supported religious or-
ganizations are pervasively sectarian-as is the case with Sav-A-Life-
We, of course, do not have complete information about the relationship, if any, between
the courts and Sav-A-Life. And it is possible that more entanglement than we have knowledge
of exists. But, even if we grant that the tangible connections between the courts and Sav-A-Life
are negligible, this does not mean that the counseling mandate survives the third prong of
Lemon.
230 Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1568 (D.D.C. 1987).
231 Id.
252 Id.
255 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988).
24 Id. at 616-17.
255 Id.
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more intensive monitoring would be required to protect against the
risks of indoctrination. This, in turn, would foster excessive entan-
glement by virtue of the necessary government intrusion into the op-
erations of this religious organization.236
B. The Coercion Test
"There is no firmer or more settled principle of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence than that prohibiting the use of the State's
power to force one to profess a religious belief or participate in a re-
ligious activity." 27 This principle underlies the coercion test and pro-
scribes government policies that coerce anyone to support or partici-
238pate in religion or its exercise.
The coercive aspect of the counseling mandate is straightforward.
Judges who send minors to Sav-A-Life condition their waiver grants
on the receipt of pro-life counseling. Given what minors seek from
judges, namely a waiver of the parental consent requirement, and
that minors have a constitutionally guaranteed right to petition forsuch . 239
such a waiver, this condition constitutes compulsion.
The only way to construe mandated counseling in a non-coercive
light is to suggest that minors have another option available to avoid
participation in such counseling. In Lee, petitioners claimed that the
option of not attending the graduation ceremony where a brief240
prayer was given mitigated the potential for coercion. One could
similarly say that a minor has the option of discussing her pregnancy
with her parents, and it is only her choice not to do so that leads to
the waiver application and the mandated pro-life counseling. In
other words, the requisite counseling comes only in the context of a
choice by minors to seek an avenue around parental involvement.
This argument lacks merit. Writing on behalf of the Court in Lee,
Justice Kennedy said, " [i] t is a tenet of the First Amendment that the
State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and
benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored reli-
gious practice., 41 Furthermore, the Court reasoned,
236 In Agostini, the Court reiterated the position that a government program causes excessive
entanglement when it requires "pervasive monitoring by public authorities" to protect against
religious inculcation. 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997).
237 Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 105 (N.Y. 1996).
238 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (finding that the Constitution guarantees
that the government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion).
239 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Bellotti I, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
240 Lee, 505 U.S. at 594-95 ("Petitioners and the United States, as amicus, made this a center
point of the case, arguing that the option of not attending the graduation excuses any induce-
ment or coercion in the ceremony itself.").
241 Id. at 596.
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to say a teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high school
graduation is formalistic in the extreme.... Attendance may not be re-
quired by official decree, yet it is apparent that a student is not free to ab-
sent herself from the graduation exercise in any real sense of the term
"voluntary," for absence would require forfeiture of those intangible
benefits which have motivated the student through youth and her high
242
school years.
If persuasive in Lee, this argument is even more persuasive in the
context of implementing parental consent statutes. -Whereas the for-
feiture in Lee included what the Court referred to as "intangible
benefits,, 24 3 with respect to parental consent statutes, a minor's consti-
tutionally recognized right to choose abortion hangs in the balance.
A minor who rejects Sav-A-Life counseling cannot be said to freely
choose parental involvement. This is especially true when a minor
seeks a judicial waiver after her parents refuse to consent, for in that
instance a minor is not choosing between involving her parents and
receiving pro-life counseling. Rather, she is choosing between con-
tinuing an unwanted pregnancy and receiving pro-life counseling.
That choice is surely untenable.2
While the coercive aspect of mandated pro-life counseling proves
uncomplicated, this alone does not settle the outcome of the coer-
cion test. It must also be shown, of course, that the coerced behavior
constitutes participation in a religious activity.145 Unlike the Supreme
Court's recent applications of the coercion test which have come in
the context of obvious religious exercises, namely public recitations
of prayer,246 here we must determine whether Sav-A-Life counseling
amounts to a religious exercise.
Toward this end, consider that all the Sav-A-Life affiliates we vis-
ited aim to share the gospel. 47 While sharing the gospel might not in
every instance be precisely the same thing as leading someone in a
242 Id. at 595.
243 Id.
244 According to the Court in Lee, "[tihe degree of school involvement here made it clear
that the graduation prayers bore the imprint of the State and thus put school-age children who
objected in an untenable position." Id. at 590.
245 This owes, of course, to the explicit proscription of the coercion test, which forbids a gov-
ernment practice that compels "anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise." Id.
at 587. What counts as religion or its exercise remains unsettled, but the Court has classified
religion as encompassing beliefs "based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all
else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent." United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163, 176 (1965). The question as to whether an activity is a religion for constitutional pur-
poses is fact-intensive. Id.
246 As Lee demonstrates, prayer constitutes religious activity. 505 U.S. at 586-87; see also Santa
Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000) ("[T he delivery of a pregame prayer [at a
high school football game] has the improper effect of coercing those present to participate in
an act of religious worship.").
247 See supra Part I.C.
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prayer, when a counselor asks a young woman "about her relation-
ship with Christ, 2 48 or says that the "only help is a relationship with
Jesus Christ, ,24 9 she engages in a religious activity. Providing counsel-
ing based on "evangelism explosion, ,-for example, asking a young
woman, "If you die tonight, will [you] go to heaven?"2 5 _-is likewise a
type of religious exercise. Showing women the Bible or certain reli-
gious tracts, as counselors at Sav-A-Life do, 212 is comparable to leading
someone in a prayer. However the gospel is shared, whether through
direct prayer, reading of Bible verses, or comments about the benefits
of committing one's life to Christ, the evidence demonstrates that
Sav-A-Life counseling is rightly characterized as a religious activity.
25 3
And, worth emphasizing, such counseling takes place in a setting that
bears the symbolic marks of religion.
It does not help matters that judges who require a pregnant mi-
nor to receive counseling from Sav-A-Life do so in advance of deter-
mining whether that minor is sufficiently mature to proceed with an
abortion absent parental consent. In so doing, the judicial policy of
mandating counseling runs the following risk: a minor who is later
deemed immature will have been required to receive religious coun-
seling. While government may not coerce anyone-whether mature
or immature, adult or child-to support or participate in religion or
its exercise, the Court has expressed particular apprehension when
such coercion affects those of an impressionable age.
254
248 Interview with Director of Say-A-Life Affiliate 3, supra note 155.
249 Interview with Director of Say-A-Life Affiliate 2, supra note 128.
250 Interview with Director of Say-A-Life Affiliate 5, supra note 161.
251 Id.
252 Interview with Director of Sav-A-Life Affiliate 4, supra note 158.
253 The evidence also suggests, as we have explained above, that Say-A-Life is rightly charac-
terized as pervasively sectarian, and we could arguably rely on this finding to settle the issue of
whether mandated Sav-A-Life counseling fails the coercion test. As Bowen and other cases ex-
plain-albeit not in the context of analyzing the coercion test-pervasively sectarian institutions
cannot separate the secular from the sectarian. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 610 (1988).
If such is the context in which religious organizations provide counseling, then we must assume
that the facially neutral activity of offering, for example, adoption counseling does become a
religious activity by virtue of being carried out by a pervasively sectarian organization. In short,
since Say-A-Life is pervasively sectarian, its education and counseling services constitute reli-
gious activity.
254 The Court's comments about the relationship between religious coercion and impres-
sionability typically have come in the context of cases involving children in elementary and sec-
ondary public schools. For example, in Edwards v. Aguillard, the Court overturned a Louisiana
statute that mandated treatment of both creationism and evolution in the state's public schools,
saying:
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Estab-
lishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools. Families entrust public schools
with the education of their children, but condition their trust on the understanding that
the classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict with
the private beliefs of the student and his or her family. Students in such institutions are
impressionable and their attendance is involuntary.
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The claim that the religiously based counseling occurs in the pri-
vate realm does not save from constitutional infirmity a policy that
conditions the waiver process on Sav-A-Life counseling. Although the
counseling takes place in the offices of a private organization and is
offered by people who are not state employees, the fact that ajudicial
policy compels the counseling places the state's imprint on the activ-
ity.255 Thus, when judges stipulate that minors obtain counseling
from Sav-A-Life, they effectively force young women to participate in
a religious activity and, in so doing, violate Establishment Clause stric-
tures against coercion.
C. The Endorsement Test
As discussed above, the endorsement test derives from Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly.256 Under this test,
"[d]irect government action endorsing religion or a particular reli-
gious practice is invalid .... Expounding upon the utility of the
endorsement test in her concurrence in Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice
O'Connor says:
In this country, church and state must necessarily operate within the
same community. Because of this coexistence, it is inevitable that the
secular interests of government and the religious interests of various sects
and their adherents will frequently intersect, conflict, and combine. A
statute that ostensibly promotes a secular interest often has an incidental
or even a primary effect of helping or hindering a sectarian belief. Chaos
would ensue if every such statute were invalid under the Establishment
Clause. For example, the State could not criminalize murder for fear
that it would thereby promote the Biblical command against killing. The
task for the Court is to sort out those statutes and government practices
whose purpose and effect go against the grain of religious liberty pro-
tected by the First Amendment.
Justice O'Connor further explains that the endorsement test does
not preclude government from acknowledging or taking account of
religion. 29 However,
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592
(1992) ("[T]here are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle
coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.").
255 The Court in Lee noted the importance of the state's "imprint" on the graduation prayer,
saying: "The degree of school involvement here made it clear that the graduation prayers bore
the imprint of the State and thus put school-age children who objected in an untenable posi-
tion." Lee, 505 U.S. at 590; see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000)
(following Lee in concluding that the degree of school involvement in the delivery of pregame
high school football prayers bears the state's imprint).
256 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying note 54.
257 Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
258 Id. at 69-70.
259 Id. at 70.
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[i]t does preclude government from conveying or attempting to convey a
message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or pre-
ferred. Such an endorsement infringes the religious liberty of the
nonadherent, for "[when] the power, prestige and financial support of
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing
officially approved religion is plain."260
Since adopting the endorsement test,26' the Supreme Court has
typically applied it in the examination of the constitutionality of pub-
lic religious displays. 262 To the extent that mandated pro-life counsel-
ing might endorse religion, it would be an endorsement that is not
on public display. This fact notwithstanding, a judge who requires
counseling offered by an evangelical Christian mission sends "a mes-
sage to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community."
2 6
Though not a public communication, the message is arguably
stronger because it comes in the context of a coercive practice. As
Justice Blackmun explains in his concurrence in Lee "Although our
precedents make clear that proof of government coercion is not nec-
essary to prove an Establishment Clause violation, it is sufficient.
Government pressure to participate in a religious activity is an obvi-
ous indication that the government is endorsing or promoting relig-
ion.,,264 Thus, enforced participation in pro-life counseling violates
the Establishment Clause "in that 'an audience gathered by state
power is lent.., to a religious cause.'
2 6 5
IV. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS AND NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS CASE LAW:
COUNTERARGUMENT OR CORROBORATION?
To our knowledge, courts have yet to consider whether condition-
ing consent waivers on a minor's receipt of faith-based, pro-life coun-
seling violates the Establishment Clause. 66 However, various state
260 Id. (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
261 See County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 573 (1989) (explain-
ing that the principles of the endorsement test have been adopted by the Court); supra Part I.B.
62 See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
263 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
264 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 604 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
2f Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 106 (N.Y. 1996) (citation omitted) (addressing com-
pelled attendance of prisoners at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings).
M The Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama did rebuke a trial courtjudge for concluding that
failure to seek counseling from a pro-life advocate shows a minor's immaturity. In re Anony-
mous, 733 So. 2d 429 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999). According to that holding:
Although our supreme court has stated that a minor who does seek the advice of a pro-
choice advocate thereby demonstrates maturity, it has never stated the converse-that a
minor who does not seek the advice of a group opposed to abortion thereby demonstrates
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and federal courts have evaluated the constitutionality of similar
practices in a relevantly similar context.167 Law enforcement person-
nel and courts often condition such things as parole, probation, good
time credits, in-prison recreational rights, and family visitation privi-
leges on alcohol or drug offenders' attendance at, participation in,
and/or successful completion of, programs based on Alcoholics
Anonymous ("AA"2" or its sister program, Narcotics Anonymous
("NA)').269 In light of the spiritual tenets of AA and NA, the fact that
these organizations were modeled after the doctrines of a religious
organization,27 ° the role of God in the Twelve Steps and Twelve Tradi-
tions (the foundation principles of AA and NA) ,27 and the use of
prayer at meetings, 72 several Establishment Clause challenges have
been brought against state-sponsored participation in these pro-
273grams.
A number of federal courts have rejected the claim that use of AA
or NA as part of parole, probation, or prisoner rehabilitation
274breaches the Establishment Clause. Because of the similarities be-
immaturity. To draw such a conclusion from the statements of the supreme court...
would be illogical.
Id. at 431 (citations omitted). Despite this holding, this particular trial court judge continues to
mandate pro-life counseling. Telephone Interview with Ala. Juvenile Court Judge, supra note
122.
267 The United States Supreme Court has yet to consider such cases.
AA "is the leading self-help, rehabilitative organization for alcoholics." Calabro, supra
note 34, at 594.
2 NA, a rehabilitative self-help organization for drug addicts, is modeled on AA. See id. at
590-91 ("Narcotics Anonymous, like A.A, follows a twelve-step program.").
270 AA's founders, Bill Wilson and Robert Smith, were strongly influenced by the teachings of
the Oxford Group, an evangelical Christian religious organization. See Apanovitch, supra note
56, at 790 (noting the Oxford Group's emphasis on aggressive evangelism and its effect on the
framers of AA); Calabro, supra note 34, at 594 (noting the influence of the Oxford Group's
teachings on the framers).
271 AA bases its treatment on twelve intervals called the "Twelve Steps" and governs its organi-
zation on twelve rules called the "Twelve Traditions." Among the Twelve Steps are the follow-
ing: (1) "Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity;"
(2) "Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as we understood Him;"
(3) "Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being the exact nature of our
wrongs;" (4) "Were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of character;"
(5) "Humbly asked Him to remove our shortcomings;" and (6) "Sought through prayer and
meditation to improve our conscious contact with God as we understood Him, praying only for
knowledge of His will for us and the power to carry that out." Apanovitch, supra note 56, at 791.
The Twelve Traditions state in part that "IfWor our group purpose there is but one ultimate au-
thority-a loving God as He may express Himself in our group conscience. Our leaders are but
trusted servants; they do not govern." Calabro, supra note 34, at 595 n.247.
272 SeeApanovitch, supra note 56, at 791 (noting that members atAA meetings frequently en-gae in group prayer).
See Calabro, supra note 34, at 596-602 (describing the nature of Establishment Clause
claims arising under these programs).
274 See, e.g., O'Connor v. California, 855 F. Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that the state
does not violate the Establishment Clause by requiring convicted drunk drivers to participate in
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tween AA and NA cases and the instant issue, the rulings of these
courts might be thought to undercut our contention that mandated
Sav-A-Life counseling intrudes on First Amendment guarantees.
A. Decisions Supporting Mandated Substance Abuse Treatment
Consider, for example, Stafford v. Harrison.275 There, a federal dis-
trict court rejected a prison inmate's claim that the Kansas Parole
Board violated the Establishment Clause by conditioning his parole
on continued treatment in AA.276 According to the ruling, "[w] hile
the spiritual nature of Alcoholics Anonymous cannot be denied, the
court is not persuaded this program may properly be characterized as
a religion. Relying on an analysis of the central text of the pro-
gram, Alcoholics Anonymous, the court stressed that the program did
not define any single image or exclusive concept of the referenced
"Higher Power., 78 Furthermore, the court explained that the mean-
ing of "Higher Power" was left to the individual participant's defini-
tion,2 79 "the program itself does not consider its system a religion,""0
and the belief in a "Supreme Being" is not "a distinguishing charac-
teristic of religion. '8 ' While acknowledging that the philosophy of
AA includes references to a Higher Power, the court argued that it
could not "on that basis alone reasonably conclude either that Alco-
holics Anonymous constitutes a religion or that a religion was
impermissibly thrust upon plaintiff during his incarceration.
2812
Similarly, in Jones v. Smid a federal district court reviewed a
prison inmate's challenge to his mandated participation in an AA
281treatment program. The inmate asserted that as part of his treat-
AA despite its religious overtones); Jones v. Smid, No. 4-89-CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562 (S.D.
Iowa Apr. 29, 1993) (holding that mandated participation in the Operating While Intoxicated
("OWl") treatment program did not violate the Establishment Clause); Stafford v. Harrison,
766 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Kan. 1991) (holding that the Establishment Clause was not violated when
a prison forced an inmate to participate in a rehabilitation program similar to AA).
275 766 F. Supp. 1014.
276 Id. at 1017-18. Serving a two to seven-year sentence for aggravated assault, Stafford had
entered an inpatient treatment program based on AA and NA principles. Due to his poor pro-
gress, he was removed from the treatment program without a certificate of satisfactory comple-
tion and, as a result, the Kansas Parole Board passed him for consideration for ten months,
again recommending his participation in an alcohol and drug treatment program. Id. at 1015-
16.
277 Id. at 1016.
278 Id. at 1016-17.
279 Id. at 1017.
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 No. 4-89-CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 29, 1993).
Jones had pleaded guilty to a third offense of driving under the influence of alcohol or a
drug. His five-year prison sentence was suspended and Jones was granted probation condi-
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ment he had been compelled to recite a promise from the Alcoholics
Anonymous book that included the statement " [w] e will suddenly real-
ize that God is doing for us what we could not do for ourselves. ''28s
The court concluded, however, that the plaintiff had been given al-
ternatives to saying "God" and that "[h] e knew he could have written
an explanation of what the promise meant to him and how it applied
in his life."28 6 In the court's view, since Jones, an adult, had alterna-
tives to reciting the word "God" in the AA promise, "[a] 'reasonable
dissenter in this milieu' would not believe the promise, delivered with
an alternative phrase, signified his own participation in, or approval
of, a religious p In addition, the court acknowledged the
spiritual character of AA but adopted Staffords reasoning that the
program did not amount to religion and left to the individual the
prerogative of defining the meaning of "higher power., 28 The court
thus concluded, using Lemon, that the state had not improperly estab-
289lished a religiously based program.
A federal district court again upheld state-sponsored use of AA in
O'Connor v. California.2 90 O'Connor, after his conviction for drunk
driving, faced probationary terms that included alcohol education
and, in particular, particip ation in weekly self-help meetings run by a
state-approved program. AA was among such approved programs,
but O'Connor had the option of attending the less accessible Ra-
212tional Recovery, a secular non-twelve-step alternative. Applying
Lemon as modified by endorsement principles, the court found that
the primary purpose and effect of mandated participation in self-help
meetings was not to advance religous belief, but to prevent drunk
driving and treat substance abuse. The court also stated that "the
fact that the concept of God is incorporated in a program in which
the State encourages participation does not in itself violate the Estab-
lishment Clause." 4 Noting the spiritual and, indeed, monotheistic
tioned upon completion of a substance abuse treatment program offered by the Fort Des
Moines Correctional Facility. Id. at *1.
29 Id. at *1-*2.
286 Id. at *2
287 Id. at *5 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992)).
28 Id. at *4.
289 Although the court cited Lee throughout its opinion, it decided under Lemon, rather than
under Lee, that the program was constitutional. According to the ruling, "[t]he court holds the
OWI program satisfies the Lemon test applied in Establishment Clause cases: The program re-
flected a clearly secular purpose, had a primary effect that neither advanced nor inhibited relig-
ion, and avoided excessive government entanglement with religion." Id. at *5.
2W 855 F. Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
29 Id. at 304.
292 Id. at 305.
293 Id. at 307.
24 Id. at 308.
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foundations of AA, the court held that a plaintiff would have to
show more than the incorporation of God into the program to estab-
lish a constitutional violation.296 The court concluded that the plain-
tiff did not show state endorsement of AA's religious message (rather
than promotion of the concept of self-help), since individuals could
choose what program to attend and since they even had the option of
creating for county approval their own program of "self-help. '297 Be-
cause the only connection between the state and AA was that indi-
viduals were required to participate in self-help meetings, and be-
cause AA was only a recommended resource for such meetings, the
plaintiff failed to show the sort of entanglement that violates the Con-
stitution. gs
B. Decisions Invalidating Mandated Substance Abuse Treatment
The judicial practice of sending minors to Sav-A-Life might appear
to find some constitutional support in the above-cited rulings.'
However, other rulings push in the opposite direction.
In Griffin v. Coughlin,00 the Court of Appeals of New York ruled in
favor of an inmate's claim that prison officials violated Establishment
Clause strictures by conditioning his participation in a family visita-
tion program on an AA-based treatment program.3 ' The court found
that
the A.A. basic doctrinal writings clearly express a preference for and a
conviction favoring a concept of God and prayer which is not merely "'a
conscientious social belief, or a sincere devotion to a high moralistic phi-
losophy [but] one based upon an individual's belief in his responsibility
to an authority higher and beyond any worldly one. _302
295 Id. at 307.
296 Id. at 308.
297 Id.
298 Id. The court also pointed out, in arriving at its conclusion regarding entanglement, that
"AA does not receive any money, materials, or administrative input from religious groups or
institutions, nor does it receive any money from the State or County in exchange for accepting
those convicted of drunk driving." Id.
299 See discussion supra Part IV.A; see also Boyd v. Coughlin, 914 F. Supp. 828, 833 (N.D.N.Y.
1996) (rejecting an Establishment Clause claim based on a prison inmate's removal from a fam-
ily visitation program for his failure to participate in the facility's substance abuse program,
which required attendance at AA or NA meetings).
3W 673 N.E.2d 98 (N.Y. 1996).
301 In so doing, the court reversed the Appellate Division's judgment, which had found no
Establishment Clause violation. According to the court, the Appellate Division had erred in
(1) "applying too narrow a concept of religion or religious activity for Establishment Clause
analysis," and (2) "disregarding the compulsion used to induce petitioner to attend and partici-
pate in A.A. meetings heavily laced with at least general religious content." Id. at 101.
302 Id. at 103 (citation omitted). In arriving at this finding, the court also considered, among
other things, that "[f]ollowers are urged to accept the existence of God as a Supreme Being,
Creator, Father of Light and Spirit of the Universe," and "[iln 'working' the 12 steps, partici-
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Based on this finding, the court declared that AA's "expressions and
practices constitute, as a matter of law, religious exercise for Estab-
lishment Clause purposes, 's° and, in turn, that the prison's use of AA
in an exclusive and compulsory treatment program violated the Es-
tablishment Clause." 4 Looking to Everson and Lee, and relying on the
coercion test,3°5 the court explained that "enforced attendance at A.A.
meetings as part of the [Treatment] Program violates the Establish-
ment Clause in that 'an audience gathered by state power is lent...
to a religious cause.' ' 306 In that way, the prison had "apparently em-
ployed the machinery of the state to gather an [involuntary] audi-
ence for religion."3 °7
In contrast to other courts' AA decisions, the Griffin court was not
swayed by the argument that, because AA's doctrines and practices
are amenable to secular interpretation, the mandated program sur-
vives Establishment Clause scrutiny. Given that AA's "paramount
theme... favors a religious interpretation," the court found that the
program violated the "wholesome neutrality" requirement of the Es-
tablishment Clause:3°8
The State, through its [Treatment] Program, delegates to A.A. volunteers
a crucial part of the State's discretionary authority to conduct mandatory
treatment programs for alcohol and drug addicted inmates in the State's
prison system. Inmates are pressured to participate in the program by
the State's conditioning eligibility for the Family Reunion Program on at-
tendance. Yet correctional authorities have not incorporated into the
[Treatment] Program any effective means to insure that A.A. meetings
for inmates are free of religious content and that rehabilitation and
309treatment are performed by purely secular means ....
pants become actively involved in seeking such a God through prayer, confessing wrongs and
asking for removal of shortcomings." Id. The court could not conceive of how one could "per-
form a confessional of 'wrongs' (Step 5) or seek, through 'prayer,' 'contact' (Step 11) with a
God devoid of religious content." Id. at 106.
3o3 Id. at 103.
Id. at 105.
30- According to the Griffin ruling, "[t]here is no firmer or more settled principle of Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence than that prohibiting the use of the State's power to force one to
profess a religious belief or participate in a religious activity." Id. The court rejected the dis-
sent's criticism that the majority had "wrongfully interjected a 'dominant' coercion element in a
'novel' or 'tenuous' manner unsupported by precedent, to Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence." Id. at 106 n.6 (citations omitted). According to the majority, the opinions of all nine of
the Justices in Lee dealt with "anticoercion as a settled precept of the Establishment Clause ei-
ther independently or as a prohibited governmental endorsement of religion in violation of the
second prong of the three-part Establishment Clause test of Lemon v. Kurtzman." Id.
W6 Id. at 106 (citation omitted).
507 Id. (alteration in original).
308 Id.
3M Id. at 107
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Noting the coercive aspects of the penal program, the court also
found that the program failed the second prong of Lemon.3"' Apply-
ing the endorsement formulation of the second Lemon prong, the
court concluded:
It is simply unimaginable that inmates in the inherently authoritarian
atmosphere of a prison would not perceive that such a mandatory, exclu-
sive program, facially containing expressions and practices that "ha[ve]
always been religious," favors inmates who adhere to those beliefs, and
symbolically condones the religious proselytizing those expressions liter-
ally reflect.3 1
Like the Griffin court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Kerr
v. Farrey31' applied the coercion test to a prison rehabilitation pro-
gram that required inmates with chemical abuse problems to partici-
pate in NA. Inmates who failed to attend NA meetings were subject
to "a higher security risk classification and negative effects on parole
eligibility. 3 13 According to the Seventh Circuit, the relevant inquiry
"when a plaintiff claims that the state is coercing him or her to sub-
scribe to religion generally, or to a particular religion" is: "first, has
the state acted; second, does the action amount to coercion; and
third, is the object of the coercion religious or secular?, 31 4 Applying
these factors to the plaintiff's case, 15 the court found that the first two
criteria were easily met.3 16 Considering the third factor, the court re-
jected the contention that because NA used phrases like "God, as we
understood Him," and because the concept of God could include the
non-religious idea of willpower within the individual, the program
was spiritual rather than religious. 7 To the contrary, the court main-
tained, "[a] straightforward reading of the twelve steps shows clearly
that the steps are based on the monotheistic idea of a single God or
Supreme Being."318 Given the religious grounding of NA and the fact
that requisite meetings were "permeated with explicit religious con-
310 The court raised this issue in asserting that the lower court had erred in its analysis. Id.
Rebutting the lower court finding, the court explained that it is not the case that "the religious
consequences of the State action must predominate over any secular objective or consequence.
No measurement or weighing of the respective secular and religious effects is required." Id. at
108. Rather, an Establishment Clause violation results if the "'inevitable effect [of the State action
is] to aid and advance' religion." Id. (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist, 413 U.S. 756, 793 (1973)).
Id. (citation omitted).
512 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996).
3.13 Id. at 474.
314 Id. at 479.
315 Kerr was an inmate at a minimum security prison in Wisconsin who claimed to have been
told by his prison social worker that attendance at NA meetings was mandatory and failed at-
tendance might result in his transfer to a medium security facility. Id. at 474.
316 Id. at 479.
317 Id. at 479-80.
318 Id. at 480.
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tent,"3 ' 9 the court concluded that the program intruded upon "the
prohibition against the state in favoring religion in general over non-
religion.3 2 °
Several other decisions echo the holdings in Griffin and Kerr. For
example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that requir-
ing AA treatment as a condition of probation-where attendees were
told to pray to God, where meetings opened and closed with group
prayer, and where participants were not offered any choice among
therapy programs-amounts to "coerced participation in a religious
exercise.0 2 ' Similarly, a federal district court in New York has held
that because participation in AA and NA constitutes religious exer-
cise, "[i]t is an inescapable conclusion that coerced attendance at
such programs therefore violates the Establishment Clause. 3 22 And,
according to a federal district court in Wisconsin, mandating a resi-
dential substance abuse treatment program based on AA and NA as
an alternative to revoking parole violates Establishment Clause stric-
tures against coercion. In arriving at this conclusion, the district
court rejected the argument that the plaintiff "needed only to request
a secular alternative. 2 4  The government must always, and not just.. ... 
32'
upon request, obey the Constitution, the court explained. Fur-
thermore, in the face of the plaintiffs weak bargaining position rela-
tive to that of the judge and parole officer, "[h] e was in no position
$19 Id.
320 Id.
321 Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1076 n.8 (2d Cir. 1997). The
court rejected the notion that the non-sectarian nature of the AA experience immunized its use
of religious symbolism and practices from Establishment Clause scrutiny. The court noted that
the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that non-sectarian religious exercise does not
fall outside of First Amendment scrutiny-"a principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause
[is] that government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion." Id. at
1076 (alteration in original).
522 Warburton v. Underwood, 2 F. Supp. 2d 306, 318 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). Although the court
advanced Lemon as the controlling analysis, id. at 315-16, the court's conclusion appeared to
turn, at least in part, on the presence of coercive aspects of the action.
2 Bausch v. Sumiec, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (E.D. Wis. 2001). Bausch had been offered
the choice between returning to prison and entering a residential substance abuse treatment
program after having violated the conditions of his parole. Id. at 1031. According to the Bausch
ruling:
Because [the treatment facility] was presented to plaintiff as the only available and feasi-
ble alternative to revocation, he faced the "force of law" and the "threat of penalty" even
more dramatically than the plaintiff in Kerr, participating in the [treatment] program
was effectively presented to him as a condition of remaining on parole, and so far as he
knew, the penalty for declining was being returned to prison.
Id. at 1034.
324 Id. at 1035.
325 Id. The court further reasoned that constitutional protections do not exist only for those
resourceful or brave enough to object, but also apply to those "who feel they have little choice
but to comply." Id.
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to request concessions or to propose alternatives."026 The court con-
cluded that, in light of this inherently coercive atmosphere, "the
need for full disclosure of an offender's constitutional alternatives is
even stronger here than in the Miranda context.0
27
C. Comparing Mandated Substance Abuse Treatment
with Mandated Sav-A-Life Counseling
The rulings that have invalidated mandatory participation in AA
or NA obviously lend strong support to our conclusion that required
counseling from Sav-A-Life infringes on First Amendment protec-
tions. Furthermore, and contrary to what one might think, the rul-
ings that have permitted the use of AA or NA do not provide grounds
for concluding that our analysis of Sav-A-Life counseling is mis-
guided. Indeed, despite their divergent holdings, the rulings that
consider state-sponsored use of AA or NA do not deviate on the fol-
lowing key point: If AA or NA programs amount to religious exer-
cise, state efforts to coerce participation in these programs run afoul
of the Establishment Clause.
The consensus surrounding this point is clear in the line of deci-
sions that have overturned mandatory AA or NA treatment. In these
cases, the courts expressly ruled that AA and NA meetings constitute
religious exercise and, when parole, probation, or prison benefits are
conditioned upon participation in these meetings, the coercive effect
is plain. In the decisions upholding reliance on AA or NA, the courts
did not explicitly make this point, but neither did they oppose it. In-
stead, those decisions turn either on a finding that AA or NA is not
religion or that coercion is absent. Nothing in any of the above-cited
cases suggests that the court in question would allow government to
coerce anyone into engaging in a religious exercise.
Still, the following questions remain. First, in light of the guid-
ance offered by the AA and NA rulings, is it appropriate to character-
ize the counseling offered by Sav-A-Life as a religious exercise? Sec-
ond, and again in light of the AA and NA decisions, have we rightly
characterized the counseling requirement as coercive?
The AA and NA rulings offer differing assessments of the religious
nature of these treatment programs. The courts in Stafford v. Harri-
son3 28 and Jones v. Smid329 were not persuaded that the spiritual charac-
326 Id. at 1036.
327 Id. "Uust as the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation may be dis-
pelled only by informing the suspect of his right to counsel, so the only way to dispel the inher-
ently coercive atmosphere present here was to advise plaintiff of his right to a meaningful secu-
lar alternative." Id. (citation omitted).
28 766F. Supp. 1014 (D. Kan. 1991).
32 No. 4-89-CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 29, 1993).
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ter of AA supported the conclusion that the program amounts to re-
ligion. By contrast, the court in Griffin v. Coughlin found that AA ten-
ets and practices necessarily entail religious exercise,"O and the Kerr v.
Farrey court concluded that NA meetings were "permeated with ex-
plicit religious content.""33
Comparing these assessments to the instant case, there can be lit-
tle question that the tenets of Sav-A-Life are fundamentally religious
and that, because counselors seek, as their main mission, to commu-
nicate a religious message, religious content permeates Say-A-Life
counseling. Thus, if we rely only on the guidance of Griffin and Kerr,
we conclude that Sav-A-Life counseling sessions are religious exercise.
But even if we adopt the guidance of Stafford and Jones, the same con-
clusion emerges. While it might be arguable that AA and NA are
spiritually, rather than religiously, oriented, the same cannot be said
of Sav-A-Life. Unlike the AA Big Book and the Twelve Steps, which
make reference to "God," a greater "Power," and the spiritual,332 Sav-
A-Life tenets refer to Jesus Christ and the specific beliefs surrounding
the death, resurrection, and second coming of Christ. Also distin-
guishable from Stafford and Jones, counseling sessions offered by Sav-
A-Life aim to share a particular religious message through the gospel
of Christ. Therefore, while one might make a plausible argument
that AA and NA programs are amenable to secular interpretation,
denying the religiosity of Sav-A-Life-a ministry that places a pre-
mium on proselytizing-at a minimum lacks credibility and, indeed,
ventures on the absurd.
Turning to the question of coercion, the judicial finding that AA
or NA programs entail religious exercise has not, by itself, deter-
mined the outcome of the cases upholding mandated participation in
AA or NA. Instead, upon finding that these programs have religious
content, courts have turned their attention to an assessment of the
coercive character of the participatory directives. In so doing, these
courts have focused especially on two matters: (1) the benefits and
costs tied to participation or non-participation in the treatment pro-
gram, and (2) whether the state provided a secular treatment alterna-
tive.
It is clear that significant benefits and costs attend the disposition
of a minor's decision whether to capitulate to mandated Sav-A-Life
counseling, just as costs and benefits attend decisions whether to par-
ticipate in AA and NA. However, when states have provided alterna-
0 673 N.E.2d 98 (N.Y. 1996).
331 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996).
332 See Griffin, 673 N.E.2d at 100 n.1 (listing the Twelve Steps and the aforementioned refer-
ences).
s33 See, e.g., GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 173; STATEMENT OF FAITH, supra note 170.
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tive secular programs as part of their treatment mandates, courts have
upheld the use of AA and NA. And even some courts that have re-
jected mandated participation in AA or NA have indicated that such
treatment mandates could withstand constitutional scrutiny if they
gave participants the option of bypassing the program's religious
components or if secular alternatives were offered. Thus, while
courts have split over whether the conditioning of benefits and sanc-
tions on participation in AA or NA constitutes coercion, this division
stems not from conflicting reasoning about the nature of coercion
but from factual findings concerning the provision of secular treat-
ment alternatives.
These holdings suggest that we must consider whether judges who
mandate pro-life counseling present minors with secular alternatives
to Sav-A-Life. Our evidence suggests, to the contrary, that Alabama
courts requiring minors to receive pro-life counseling specify Sav-A-
Life. While we have not spoken with all the judges who routinely is-
sue this mandate, those with whom we have spoken explicitly men-
tion Sav-A-Life. Moreover, attorneys who represent minors before
these judges, as well as some directors of Sav-A-Life affiliates, cor-
roborate the finding that judges require counseling from Sav-A-Life
in particular.
3 35
Still, a judge who imposes this requirement might counter that
counseling from any CPC would suffice, and that the referral to Sav-A-
Life owes only to the widespread availability of affiliate offices. For
the sake of the argument, we will assume this is true and consider
whether such a scenario would sustain the conclusion that minors
have been given a secular alternative to Sav-A-Life counseling.
To proceed with this consideration, let us examine those CPCs
that are not associated with the thirty-three Sav-A-Life offices in Ala-
bama. We found ten such CPCs"' each of which serves a religious,
though not necessarily evangelical, mission.337
34 See, e.g., Alexander v. Schenk, 118 F. Supp. 2d 298, 302 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that
while coerced participation in a correctional facility's AA-based treatment program violates the
Establishment Clause, the program would likely survive constitutional scrutiny if prisoners were
permitted to opt out of religious portions of the program).
335 See supra Part II.B.
336 Unlike Say-A-Life, which has a central website listing all of its affiliate offices, there is no
such website that catalogs all CPCs in Alabama. To locate the non-Say-A-Life CPCs we per-
formed a web-based search of Yahoo's yellow pages for "abortion alternatives," "crisis preg-
nancy," and "pregnancy counseling" in and beyond the following cities in Alabama: Tuscaloosa,
Huntsville, Montgomery, Birmingham, Mobile, and Dothan. To the extent that crisis preg-
nancy centers are listed in Yahoo's yellow pages, this search covers virtually all of Alabama. In
addition, we cross-checked these findings against the websites of the major CPC umbrella or-
ganizations, including Care Net (http://www.care-net.org), Birthright International (http://
www.birthright.org), Heartbeat International (http://www.heartbeatinternational.org), Amer-
ica's Crisis Pregnancy Helpline (http://www.thehelpline.org), and Bethany Christian Services
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While evangelism is not the goal of all the non-Sav-A-Life CPCs in
Alabama, it does provide the mission of some. For example, the Real
Life Crisis Pregnancy Center, with two locations in Alabama, explains,
"On behalf of countless unborn children.., we have presented each
person that has come to us with the message of hope that is present
in the life-changing gospel of Jesus Christ." 3 8 The Autauga Crisis
Pregnancy Center, a self-described "Christian Pro-Life Ministry,"
holds an affiliation with Care Net, an umbrella organization that
boasts a network of 750 pregnancy resource centers across the United
States and Canada. s9 While Care Net's Web site says little about the
organization's religious foundations, the affiliate application form
indicates the religious grounding of the organization and its mem-
bers. Care Net's stated mission "is to promote and assist the evangel-
istic, pro-life work of pregnancy centers in North America."3 40 Mem-
bership in Care Net requires adherence to the organization's
"Standards of Affiliation," the first of which states that the "primary
mission of the center is to share the truth and love of Jesus Christ in
conjunction with a ministry to those facing pregnancy related is-
sues. "0 4 1 Membership also entails agreement with Care Net's "State-
ment of Principle," which explains that the "pregnancy center is an
outreach ministry of Jesus Christ through His church. Therefore, the
pregnancy center, embodied in its volunteers, is committed to pre-
senting the gospel of our Lord to women with crisis pregnancies-
both in word and in deed." 42
All the other non-Sav-A-Life CPCs share affiliations with Catholic
churches or other Catholic organizations, or, even if nondenomina-
tional, receive support from the Catholic Church. For example, 2B
(http://www.bethany.org). Finally, we cross-checked our findings against the list of CPCs avail-
able at OptionLine (http://www.pregnancycenters.org) and Lifecall (http://www.lifecall.org).
While we cannot be certain that we located every non-Sav-A-Life CPC in Alabama, we believe
these searches identified most, if not all, of these organizations.
337 In January 2002, our research assistant contacted these ten CPCs by phone to determine
their religious affiliations and whether they define themselves as Christian ministries.
33 Real Life Crisis Pregnancy Ctrs., Real Life Mission, at http://www.reallifecpc.org/
mission.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
339 Care Net, at http://www.care-net.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
340 CARE NET, PREGNANCY CENTER AFFILIATION PACKAGE, supra note 221, at 4.
31 Id. at 8-9.
342 Id. at 8, 11. Care Net affiliates also adopt a "Statement of Faith" which expresses belief in
the Bible, the trinity, and "the deity of our Lord Jesus Christ, in His virgin birth, in His sinless
life, in His miracles, in His vicarious and atoning death through His shed blood, in His bodily
resurrection, in His ascension to the right hand of the Father, and in His personal return in
power and glory." Id. at 10. With an annual affiliation fee, members receive, among other
things, an "Evangelism Manual," id. at 2, that serves to teach affiliates how "to share Christ with
[their] clients" and "[ifncludes stories of actual evangelistic situations." Care Net, Online Re-
source Catalog, at http://www.care-net.org/bookstore (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
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Choices, a CPC in Mobile, is part of Daughters of Charity, 343 an or-
ganization of Catholic women who are "urged by the charity of Christ
to reach out to those most in need.",3  Wiregrass Emergency Preg-
nancy and Her Choice Birmingham are affiliated with Catholic or-
ganizations. 5 COPE (Counseling Outreach for Pregnancy Emer-
gency), with two locations in or near Montgomery, is a
nondenominational CPC that was started by the Archdiocese of Mo-
bile. 46
While the CPCs associated with Catholic organizations do not
adopt an evangelical approach, religion grounds their missions. As
the director of one of these CPCs explained in distinguishing her or-
ganization from those CPCs that adopt an evangelical approach,
Our approach is ecumenical. Our spiritual dimension [is that] we're not
here to convert women .... We'll talk about God and the sanctity of life,
and why life is precious .... Under the Christian Ecumenical approach,
God is the creator of life and he is the taker of life and that can be un-
derstood whether you're Catholic, Hindu, Muslim, orJew. 47
The director of another CPC, the office of which is located in a
Catholic Church, illuminated how religion makes its way into coun-
seling. "Ultimately, at the very end, if they haven't indicated that
they're going to have the baby, we ask them to pray on it and think
about it and to talk to us again. 348 When asked whether counselors
seek to share the gospel with clients, this director answered, "It de-
pends on the client, but normally we don't. We tell them God meant
for this baby to be born. These are a blessing."3 49
Placing more emphasis on witnessing, a third CPC director never-
theless expressed the view that religious counseling should be bal-
anced with attending to the particular and immediate needs of the
client:
You're not going to push religion down their throats. I hope all of us
here witness. But I had a client who was in tears because at another CPC
she was told that what she's done is against God's will. We bring the
spiritual into it, but right now she needs so much.... As she comes back,
she might ask us to pray for her. I've had them come in and say, "I don't
want to be saved," or "I am saved," but here they're doing the same thing
33 See Daughters of Charity, Ministries & Contacts, at http://www.doc.org/contact/
alabama.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
44 Daughters of Charity, About Us, at http://www.doc.org/about/index.asp (last visited Oct.
30, 2004).
35 Interview with Director of non-Sav-A-Life CPC 1, in Ala. (July 23, 2003); Phone Contact
with non-Say-A-Life CPC (Jan. 2002).
Interview with Director of non-Sav-A-Life CPC 2, in Ala. (July 24, 2003). The organization
continues to receive funding from the Archdiocese.
347 Interview with Director of non-Sav-A-Life CPC 1, supra note 345.
M8 Interview with Director of non-Sav-A-Life CPC 3, in Ala. (July 23, 2003).
349 Id.
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over and over. I've seen so many women. All I can do is think of their
needs at the time. So I don't start right away with accept Christ in your
life. We start off focusing on women and their needs, and then religion
comes in. I had a woman once who was pregnant, was living in a car; her
husband wants her to have an abortion, and she is so torn up about what
to do. She didn't know whether to have an abortion; she felt it was
wrong, but her husband wanted her to have it. Finally, I said, "Do you
have a prayer book?" I said, "It's God who is going to get you through it."
Since then, she said she prayed everyday.
350
Whether evangelical or not, the non-Sav-A-Life CPCs in Alabama
share a religious mission. And the three non-Sav-A-Life CPC offices
that we visited, like those of Sav-A-Life, bear the marks of religion.
Indeed, religious symbolism appears throughout the rooms of these
CPCs and includes crosses, depictions of Jesus, biblical verses, and the
like. Given what we learned from interviews as well as what we can
glean from publicly available information, it would be hard to deny
the fundamentally religious-as opposed to merely spiritual-
character of these organizations. 5'
Even if it were true that some of these ten CPCs routinely pro-
vided secular pro-life counseling, those located in or near the coun-
ties where judges impose the counseling mandate are clearly reli-
gious.3 12 Furthermore, no alternative CPCs are found in two counties
where judges send minors to learn the pro-life perspective. There-
fore, judges would be hard-pressed to make the claim that when mi-
nors seek pro-life counseling they have a reasonable choice between
secular and sectarian alternatives.
In sum, several judges in Alabama mandate Sav-A-Life counseling
as a condition for waiver grants. Applying the guidance of the AA
and NA case law, we find that the patently religious nature of Sav-A-
Life counseling and the coercive nature of the counseling mandate
add up to a clear violation of the Establishment Clause. Were judges
to relax their mandate and allow counseling from any Alabama CPC,
it is unlikely such a move would save the mandate from constitutional
infirmity, given the religious character of the non-Save-A-Life CPCs.
It is unlikely that these CPCs provide the secular alternative to Say-A-
Life required by the AA and NA case law.
Interview with Director of non-Sav-A-Life CPC 2, supra note 346. This director further
explained her goal in talking with clients: "I'm trying to get girls to see that the baby is a gift
from God, not a tumor." Id.
3 Because the non-Sav-A-Life CPCs are, for the most part, independent of one another, and
because we visited only three, our inferences about the nature of their organizations and, spe-
cifically, about their counseling practices are not easily generalized. Still, our conclusion that
these organizations are religious, as opposed to merely spiritual, is well-grounded in the evi-
dence.
2 The non-Sav-A-Life CPCs we visited were chosen based on their proximity to the counties
where judges mandate pro-life counseling.
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CONCLUSION
The Court has ruled that a public high school student compelled,
against her religious beliefs, to listen to a two-minute, non-
denominational invocation and benediction at her graduation suffers
injury that is not de minimis.313 If that injury is one of consequence,
how might we describe the injury suffered by a minor subjected to
unwanted counseling at Sav-A-Life? The graduating high school stu-
dent listens silently to an invocation and benediction. That student
stands as one among many. No one asks the student to respond to
the prayer; and the student is not required to listen to the prayer for
more than a short time. The prayer speaks not of Jesus or Vishnu or
Allah, but, more generally, of "God" and "Lord., 35 4 The student "can
concentrate on joining its message, meditate on her own religion, or
let her mind wander. 35 5 By contrast, going to Say-A-Life exposes a
pregnant minor to more than just a short prayer. She faces counsel-
ing that lasts from thirty to sixty minutes. 35 6 While not all of that
counseling directly addresses religious matters, religion undergirds
the conversation. And, notably, it is a conversation. Unlike the silent
graduating senior who remains free to let her mind wander, counsel-
ors expect the pregnant minor to respond to religious questions:
questions directed to her and her alone; questions about a specific
God, namely Jesus Christ; questions about her relationship with that
God; questions about heaven, hell, and maybe even Satan; questions
posed in a setting where a cross, an image of Jesus, Mary, or some
other sectarian symbolism hangs on the wall. And, not to be over-
looked, the two situations have an undeniable qualitative difference.
While the high school student forced to listen to the recitation of a
prayer may justifiably suffer offense and feel indignant and alienated,
the minor seeking a parental consent waiver faces a life-changing de-
cision, of which the religiously-based counseling has become an inte-
gral part.
One might think that given this considerable injury, a legal chal-
lenge to this policy would be forthcoming. Indeed, it is a commonly
held belief that the protections afforded by the Constitution provide
353 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992).
354 Id. at 581-82.
355 Id. at 594.
356 See, e.g., Interview with Director of Sav-A-Life Affiliate 4, supra note 158 ("Every girl
watches a video.... The videos are 25 minutes. The whole counseling session is about
an hour."). Compare id. ("We ask the girls with positive tests to be part of Life Choices. It's a
program that includes 6 more visits while pregnant."), with Warner v. Orange County Dep't of
Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1076 (2d Cir. 1997) ("In contrast to the plaintiff in Lee, who 'was sub-
jected only to a brief two minutes of prayer on a single occasion,' Warner 'was required to par-
ticipate in a long-term program of group therapy that repeatedly turned to religion as the basis
of motivation.").
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the necessary shield against rights infringements and that, even when
the shield becomes permeable, obvious rights infringements will not
long endure. The allure of "the myth of rights"-that is, the view that
"the political order in America actually functions in a manner consis-
tent with the patterns of rights and obligations specified in the Con-
stitution" 57 -leads us to trust in our rights and their implementation
by judges and courts. So, one might think, it should not be too long
before a challenge to this counseling mandate emerges and the pol-
icy is struck down by a court.
Moreover, in this particular case, minors have the benefit of ap-
pointed legal counsel. With legal counsel on her side, a minor could
mount a legal challenge in an effort to "evoke a declaration of
rights." 5  And if the Sav-A-Life mandate produces the magnitude of
constitutional injury we have described, surely an attorney would
help, and maybe even advise, the minor to undertake such an effort.
As reasonable as this might sound, the context in which this Estab-
lishment Clause violation occurs makes the prospect of a legal chal-
lenge to the judicial practice decidedly unlikely. Even in the best of
circumstances, a minor who petitions for a waiver of parental consent
does so with considerable apprehension. Such a minor confronts not
only the stress of an unwanted pregnancy and the prospect of termi-
nating that pregnancy, but also a hearing before an authoritative
stranger whose decision may dramatically alter her life. "Generally
they're so frightened to be in there," one attorney said of minors who
appear before judges in waiver hearings. 359 To imagine that such a
minor would add to the anxiety of the waiver process an Establish-
ment Clause challenge when, as her alternative, she can seek counsel-
ing from Say-A-Life, ignores the vulnerable position in which a minor
finds herself. In particular, a minor who pursues such a challenge
runs an increased risk that her parents will discover her situation.
Add to this the time pressure of an advancing pregnancy and the ad-
ditional stress associated with protracted legal proceedings and we
should hardly be surprised that when presented with the options of
going to Say-A-Life and initiating a lawsuit, a minor would choose the
former.
While an attorney representing a minor in this situation might
well appreciate the constitutional violation produced by the counsel-
ing mandate, that attorney would nevertheless be hard-pressed to en-
357 STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 17 (1974).
&M Those who believe in the myth of rights ideology accept the assumption that "[t]he prin-
cipal institutional mechanism of the myth of rights is litigation, which we are encouraged to
view as an effective means for obtaining declarations of rights from the courts, for assuring re-
alization of those rights, and for building a more just social order." Id. at 14.
3 Telephone Interview with Attorney representing minors in Ala. (May 16, 2001).
[Vol. 7:2
RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT
courage the young women to file a legal challenge. According to
some attorneys who represent minors, serving the client in this type
of case means securing a waiver of parental consent rather than ob-
jecting to what might amount to impermissible hurdles placed in the
minor's path. As one attorney explained: "Whether I believe that
this little girl should say she's prayed about it and thinks it's a sin,
whatever hoops she has to come through, she can jump through and
get her waiver, and as long as that happens, I'm happy."6 When
asked whether objections to these hoops get raised at hearings, this
attorney added: "Do I object? No, because the waiver would be de-
nied.... And if I would have to take it up on appeal, I don't know
what the Court of Civil Appeals would do."61 Emphasizing the reality
of pursuing the waiver process in the "Bible Belt" and before conser-
vative judges, this attorney defended her approach:
This is the system that I work under. And the system is what those judges
believe: as long as they follow the law, the ethereal constitutional right of
being unduly burdened doesn't matter .... And if it were my choice, she
would do a two-step and get her waiver .... Yes, these judges place more
of a boulder in the pathway of abortion .... But it is the system and chal-
lenging them on the basis of that is not going to help these girls.... And
if I do that, if I challenge all of these questions on religion and on what-
ever, I'm not going to be appointed to these cases. And I tell them that
you have this choice [to terminate your pregnancy], this is not wrong,
this is a constitutional right, and by God you have the right to do with
your body what you want to do, but let me tell you how we're going to do
362
this hearing.
Another attorney also highlighted this reality in explaining how
impermissible implementation of the waiver process persists:
Who's going to stop it? And judges do what they want to do and when
they want to do it. If you care about your next client and paying your
bills, you have to get along with the judges. And what are you going to
do, ask them to recuse themselves? They won't recuse themselves. And
all you've done is ask them to recuse themselves and then you have to
deal with them. That can hurt your next client. Look at what we've got
here. We just elected Judge Roy Moore, the Ten Commandments Judge
[to the State Supreme Court]. He said in a case [when he was a circuit
judge] "I am not following the order thatJudge Price issued to me." We
elected him! Nobody did anything about it.3
63
Telephone Interview with Attorney representing minors in Ala., supra note 121. Though
"happy" with the outcome, this attorney expressed her frustration and anger at the manner in
which judges implement the waiver process, saying "I come home and slam my books around
after these hearings." Id.
361 Id.
362 Id.
N3 Id.
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Minors and their attorneys cannot be faulted for adopting a
pragmatic approach. It might even be fair to say that the nature of
the situation compels this sort of pragmatism. And therein lies the
rub about the myth of rights. The myth is sustained by a tendency of
the mind toward idealization, as if cases were adjudicated in Plato's
Courtroom.364 But in the world, it is sometimes necessary and often
rational for those without resources or power to tough it out. There
are worse things in this world than having one's rights violated. This
is why judges will, in all likelihood, continue to mandate counseling
from Sav-A-Life despite the constitutional infirmities of such a prac-
tice. No one is in a position to stop them.
The idea of adjudicating cases in Plato's Courtroom comes from Wayne Fishman.
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